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REGULAR TAKINGS OR REGULATORY TAKINGS?:
LAND EXPROPRIATION IN RURAL CHINA
Valerie Jaffee Washburn
Abstract: This article takes as its starting point the recent spate of unrest in rural
China over government takings of rural, agricultural land. Though the popular and
scholarly press has paid a great deal of attention to this issue, few analyses have explored
in depth the institutional and legal framework surrounding it. This piece first attempts
such an exploration and concludes that the underlying issues have as much to do with
China's national land use regulatory system as they do with the behavior of local
governments that seize privately-farmed land for other uses. In fact, it is more productive
to see this as a regulatory takings issue than an eminent domain issue. With that analysis
in mind, the article proceeds to explain why commonly-presented proposals for solving
the rural takings problem are inadequate and then offers a novel solution based on the
regulatory takings analysis: granting individual farmers transferrable, monetizable land
development rights that will be separable from the land use rights that are the basis of the
current rural land ownership regime.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In June of 2006, hundreds of Chinese farmers in the village of
Sanzhou, Guangdong Province, armed with clubs and bottles of acid, held
government officials and businesspeople hostage inside a newly-constructed
apartment building for almost twenty-four hours.1 Earlier that year, police
armed with electric batons clashed with over 1000 farmers wielding
pitchforks outside the village of Panlong, also in Guangdong Province. 2
The clash may have been responsible for the death of a thirteen-year-old girl,
and as many as sixty people were wounded in the struggle.3 Just over a
month before that, in nearby Dongzhou village, at least three and as many as
thirty people were killed when police fired on a group of villagers who had
lobbed fireworks and possibly homemade bombs at police. The Dongzhou
incident was the deadliest use of force by Chinese security personnel against
Chinese citizens since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.4
1

Edward Cody, One Riot Breaks Ground in China; This Time, Officials Respond to Farmers’
Protest With Pledge to Review Land Deal, WASH. POST, June 28, 2006, at A14.
2
Hannah Beech, Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion: Across China’s Heartland, Anger at Local
Authorities is Growing Violent. Is This the Birth of a Revolution?, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 28.
3
Id.; Howard W. French, Police in China Battle Villagers in Land Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2006, at A1.
4
The official death toll announced by the Chinese state-run media was three, but villagers’ reports
and the Western media set it much higher. Howard W. French, Protesters Say Police in China Killed Up to
20, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter 20 Killed]; Geoffrey York, Police Commander Arrested
After Fatal Protest in China; Amnesty International Issues Call for Independent Probe into Village Attack,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 12, 2005, at A14. See also Howard W. French, Villages Tell of Lethal Attack
by Chinese Forces on Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Lethal Attack].
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These incidents are part of a minor epidemic of unrest that has gripped
rural China in recent years. What unites them, besides their sensationalism,
is the nature of the conflicts that inspired them. In each incident, farmers
were protesting decisions by local government officials over the use of
village land. “[E]nvironmental, property rights, and land-use issues” have
been the single largest source of civil unrest in China in recent years, and
disputes involving rural land have, as the above episodes indicate, been
especially incendiary. 5 This is not a phenomenon unique to wealthy
Guangdong Province; protests also erupted over the use of rural land in
Huaxi, Zhejing Province in 2006;6 Hanyuan, Sichuan Province in 2004;7
Jinyuan, Zhejiang Province in 2003; 8 and numerous other locales.
The farmers in Sanzhou were protesting the seizure of 750 acres of
agricultural land by the village government. That land had been sold to a
developer who built the apartment building where the incident took place;
the farmers claimed that the compensation paid for the land taken was
inadequate.9 The protesters in Panlong resented both the seizure of village
farmland for lease to a foreign investor and the level of compensation
offered.10 The catalyst for the disturbance in Dongzhou was the construction
of a coal-fired power plant. Villagers were upset over the prospect of air
pollution and plans to fill in a local body of water. Also, like their
counterparts in Sanzhou and Panlong, they were angered by the seizure of
farmland for the project and asserted that the compensation offered was too
low.11
One Western journalist has wondered if the incidents might represent
“the birth of a revolution.”12 This is surely hyperbole, but there remains
5
20 Killed, supra note 4 (China’s Ministry of Public Security counted 87,000 incidents of social
unrest in China in 2005. This represented an increase of 6% from 2004 and 50% from 2003). Zhu Keliang
& Roy Prosterman, From Land Rights to Economic Boom, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, Jul.-Aug. 2006,
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0607/zhu.html; see also Pallavi Aiyar, China:
More
rights
for
millionaires,
ASIA
TIMES,
Mar.
22,
2007,
available
at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IC22Ad01.html. Rural expropriation disputes caused more separate
incidents of civil unrest than any other issue in China in 2006. Josephine Ma, Land Seizure Rows the Main
Cause of Unrest in ’06, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31, 2007.
6
Clifford Coonan, Unrest Grows in China Over Land Grabs, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/unrest-grows-in-rural-china-over-land-grabs468893.html.
7
Andrew C. Murtha, The Ubiquity and Fungibility of Property Rights in China, 16-17 (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8
Property Seizure in China: Roundtable Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 108th Cong. 35
(2004) (prepared statement of Roy L. Prosterman, President, Rural Development Institute).
9
Cody, supra note 1.
10
Beech, supra note 2.
11
Lethal Attack, supra note 4.
12
Beech, supra note 2.
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little doubt that how to manage rural land is one of the most pressing issues
facing the Chinese government today.13 Opportunities for public debate on
this issue have been especially plentiful over the past decade, in part because
of the passage of a new comprehensive Property Law, which had been under
debate since 2004, by the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) in March of
2007.14 It has been suggested that the thorny question of how to deal with
rural land was the most important reason why completion and passage of the
law took so long.15
Media and scholarly attention has generally treated these conflicts as
indications of pathologies in China’s laws governing takings of rural land
and the compensation offered when such takings occur. As will be
discussed below, however, that understanding of the problem is incomplete.
Below, I first analyze China’s legal regime governing rural land ownership,
use, and takings; the conceptual implications and practical effects of that
system; and the drawbacks of various proposals offered by both Chinese and
Western scholars for improving that system. To date, these proposals have
tended to revolve conceptually around the ownership of rural land, drawing
from theories and policy of eminent domain to approach the problem of
what happens when government seizes rural land for a new use and often
advocating measures that would strengthen the quasi-ownership rights of
Chinese farmers to their land. My interpretation of the pathologies in the
current system, however, is that the underlying problem is one of land use
rather than ownership. My analysis supports a new focus that treats the
Chinese rural land problem as every bit as much a regulatory takings
problem as a problem of ordinary takings by eminent domain. This new
focus in turn supports my proposal for the introduction of tradable land
development rights in rural land as the most promising solution to the social
and political ills indicated by catastrophic events like those in Sanzhou,
Panlong, and Dongzhou.

13

See Fat of the Land, but only for a select few, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2006, for an excellent
summary of the issues at stake.
14
Wuquan fa [Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective
Oct. 1, 2007), 3 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 291 (2007), available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “Property
Law”]. See generally Landmark Property Law Adopted, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 2007, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/16/content_829330.htm; Caught Between Right and Left,
Town
and
Country,
ECONOMIST,
Mar.
8,
2007,
at
23,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/8815195; Jim Yardley, China Nears Passage of Landmark Property Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/business/09yuan.html.
15
Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snapshot From the Ground, 24
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2006).
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II.

CHINESE LAW OF PROPERTY IN RURAL LAND: AN INTRODUCTION

A.

Ownership of Rural Land

Different ownership regimes for urban and rural land were established
not long after the Communist government took power in 1949. By the
1960s, the State owned the vast majority of urban land. 16 However, the
story went quite differently for rural land. Following the widespread
redistribution of land from landlords to farmers in the early years of the
Communist republic, the right of farmers to own agricultural land was
acknowledged in Article 8 of the 1954 Chinese constitution. However, that
same constitutional provision also “encouraged” farmers to join and
contribute their land to agricultural cooperatives and stated as a goal the
gradual elimination of private ownership of rural land. In reality, most
Chinese peasants never experienced a set of rights approximating full
ownership of the land they farmed. After the Great Leap Forward of 1958,
despite the continuation of the constitutional provision recognizing
individual ownership of rural land, actual possession and control of that land
was divided between communes, brigades, and production teams.
Production teams retained the primary right to organize the cultivation and
other use of rural land.17 Peasant households enjoyed virtually no rights to
possess or use discrete parcels of land autonomously.
This reality was finally acknowledged when the Chinese government
rewrote the nation’s constitution in 1982. Article 10 of the 1982 constitution
provided that all rural and suburban land shall be “collectively owned.”18
That provision continues in effect today; the current constitution, most
recently revised in 2004, provides:
All urban land is owned by the state. Land in rural and
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those
portions which belong to the state in accordance with the law;
16
See PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 10 (2000); Chengri
Ding, Land Policy Reform in China: Assessment and Prospects, 20 LAND USE POL’Y 109, 112 (2003). But
see Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
227, 241 (2004) (“Some Chinese scholars argue that the land underneath privately owned homes also
remained privately owned in law up until [the early 1980s].”).
17
Jamie Horsley, Land Ownership in China: A Brief Review of the Documentary Record, (May 12,
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the China Law Center, Yale Law School).
18
Id.
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house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land are also
owned by collectives.19
In other words, under the Chinese constitution, land ownership is bifurcated;
all land is owned either by the state or by the rural economic organizations
known as “collectives.”
The distinction between state and collective ownership is crucial to
Article 10 of the constitution and, as will be discussed below, to many of the
most severe problems currently plaguing the Chinese system of property in
land. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that the distinction is, for many practical
purposes, not terribly clear or important. The term “collective” is not
defined in the constitution, and there is some uncertainty over what sort of
entity should play that role. It is quite common for the village “small group”
(xiaozu, 小组) or the “natural village” (ziran cun,自然村), an organizational
vestige of the production teams that controlled collective agriculture before
the reforms of the 1980s, to act as collective owners. 20 However, other
entities, including town (zhen) governments and administrative villages
(xingzheng cun, 行政村), also act as collective landowners in a number of
rural areas.21 The village small group’s legal authority is tenuous; it is not a
governmental entity or a legal person,22 and in practice its authority is often
subordinated to that of village or town governments.23
Several observers have noted that other governmental entities
frequently assert control over the land use decisions of collective
organizations; in other words, the same entities that are the official owners
of state-owned (urban) land have the capacity to interfere with the decisions
made by the official owners of collectively-owned (rural) land.24

19

XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).
According to one study, around 45% of collectively-owned land is owned by these entities.
Yongshun Cai, Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership?: The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in
China, 175 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 662, 665 (2003). Another puts the figure at 68%. YE JIANPING et al.,
eds., ZHONGGUO NONCUN TUDI CHANQUAN ZHIDU YANJIU [RESEARCH ON CHINA’S SYSTEM OF PROPERTY IN
RURAL LAND] 68 (2000).
21
Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 24 (statement of Roy L. Prosterman).
22
See Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, Annual Report, 2006, Part VII, available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt06/CivilSociety.php (discussing collectives’ nebulous
legal status).
23
Wen Wei Po, Rural Land Reform Urgent: Shanghai Analyst, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Jan. 3, 2001 (summarizing an interview with Yin Kunhua, director of the Real Estate
Research Center at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics).
24
Yonshun Cai, supra note 20, at 665-66; Xiaolin Guo, The Role of Local Government in Creating
Property Rights: A Comparison of Two Townships in Northwest Yunnan, in ANDREW G. WALDER & JEAN
C. OI, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 71, 77-78 (1999); Stein, supra note 15, at 3620
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Use of Rural Land: Individual Land Use Rights

Around the same time that the Chinese constitution clearly established
that collectives, and not individuals, owned rural land, individual households
were gradually regaining practical control over the use and proceeds of
arable land. The “household responsibility system,” instituted in rural areas
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sought to improve agricultural
productivity by de-communalizing the agricultural production process.
Under this system, contracts between collectives and farming households
grant households the right to farm individual parcels of land in exchange for
the fulfillment of certain obligations, including payment of taxes and
production quotas.25 Once those obligations are met, the farmers have the
right to any residual income earned from farming the land.26 They also have
the right to make all decisions regarding agricultural production on the
land.27 The two major national statutes that currently govern use rights in
rural land are the 1998 Land Administration Law (“LAL”) and the 2002
Rural Land Contracting Law (“RLCL”). Some provisions of these statutes
are supported or expanded upon by the 2007 Property Law, and by the
Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform
and Development (“Decision on Major Issues”) issued by the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2008.28
Under the existing statutory framework, rural land use rights (“LURs”)
in some ways resemble full economic ownership less than they do a social
entitlement contingent on the holder’s place of residence and membership in
a rural collective. A collective is permitted to transfer LURs to individuals
37. But see YE JIANPING, supra note 20, at 82-84 (arguing that collectives still play an independently
meaningful role in rural land management).
25
Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999) 4 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 341, at arts.
9, 14 (1998) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “LAL”]; Nongcun tudi chengbao fa [Rural Land Contracting Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003) 5
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 347 (2002) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter “RLCL”]. See also, e.g.,
Chris Bramall, Chinese Land Reform in Long-Run Perspective and in the Wider East Asian Context, 4 J.
AGRARIAN CHANGE 107, 108 (2004); Xiaolin Guo, supra note 24, at 71; Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S.
Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 689
(2003); Kari Madrene Larson, A Lesson in Ingenuity: Chinese Farmers, the State, and the Reclamation of
Farmland for Most Any Use, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 831, 836-37 (1998); Murtha, supra note 7, at 7.
26
See, e.g., RLCL, supra note 25 at art. 16; Yongshun Cai, supra note 20 at 665-66.
27
RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 16. But see Xiaolin Guo, supra note 24, at 75-77 (describing efforts
by government officials in one rural locale to interfere with the crop mix decisions of farmers).
28
See Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tuijin nongcun gaige fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding
[Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Advancement of Rural Reform and Development] (promulgated
by the Central Comm. Chinese Communist Party, Oct. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=7542&keyword= (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Decision
on Major Issues].
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who are not members of the collective; however, such a transaction may not
take place without the approval of both two-thirds of the villagers’
representatives and the town government.29 Farming households who seek
to transfer their LURs must give a certain degree of preference to potential
transferees who are members of the same collective. 30 Perhaps most
tellingly, collectives are required to cancel the LURs of farmers who move
to and obtain residence permits in major cities.31 The personal status of the
rights holder is crucial to the very nature of the rights, and a change in that
status can lead to the cancellation of those rights.
A recent change in the direction of enhancing farmers’ rights in land
has been the explicit authorization and encouragement of voluntary, marketbased transfer of agricultural LURs among farming households. Such
transfers appear to have been rare until the late 1990s, at which point they
increased drastically in frequency, at least in some areas of the country.32
Calls for a clearer legal framework governing such transfers were then
answered by the RLCL in 2002 and the Decision on Major Issues in 2008.33
29

LAL, supra note 25, at art. 15.
RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 33.
31
RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 26. A farming household needs to move to a city that is large enough
to be divided into multiple administrative districts (shequdeshi, 设区的市) in order to lose its LURs.
Households that move to smaller cities (xiaochengzhen, 小城镇) must be allowed to retain their rural LURs.
Id. Interestingly, rural LUR holders who switch from agricultural to non-agricultural living are allowed to
retain their LURs; it is geographical identity, and not occupation, that determines their rights. RLCL, supra
note 25 art. 41.
This rule may change in the foreseeable future. Previous drafts of the Property Law reiterated the
requirement in the RLCL that LURs be cancelled for rural families that move to large cities. Wuquan fa:
cao’an [Draft Property Law] (released for comment by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 2005) 5 STANDING
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 348
at art. 135 (2005, available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=339451&pdmc=zxbd
(P.R.C.)
[hereinafter 2005 Draft Property Law]. The final version of the Property Law, however, omits any mention
of this requirement. See Property Law, supra note 14. While this does not mean that the relevant provision
in the RLCL has been invalidated, it does provide more leeway for the NPC to remove it pursuant to future
amendments to the RLCL than if such a requirement had also been enshrined in the Property Law. For
now, the Property Law refers to the RLCL for law on rural LUR transfers. See Property Law, supra note
14, at art. 129.
32
Qian Forrest Zhang et al., Development of Land Rental Markets in Rural Zhejiang: Growth of Offfarm Jobs and Institution Building 180 CHINA Q. 1031, 1034 (2004); Qian Forrest Zhang, Do Rural Land
Markets Increase Inequality? Evidence from a Chinese Province 1 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author).
33
RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 10, 32, 33, 36, 37; China Extends Rural Reform and Development in
New
Party
Document,
PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE,
Oct.
20,
2008,
at
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6517482.html. See also Property Law, supra note 14, at
art. 129; Nongcun tudi chengbaojingyingquan liuzhuan guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of
Circulation of Rural Land Contracted Management Right] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Jan.
19,
2005,
effective
Mar.
1,
2005),
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=3933&keyword=rural
land
(P.R.C.).
See
generally CHE YUBIN, ZHONGGUO NONGDI LIUZHUAN JIZHI YANJIU (RESEARCH ON THE MECHANISM OF
CHINESE RURAL LAND TRANSFER) (2004); see also YE JIANPING, supra note 20, at 77-82 (describing novel
30
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These documents provide that rural LURs may be circulated through a
number of transfer forms, including subcontract, lease, and exchange,34 for
terms not to exceed the remaining life of the underlying contract.35
An increase in such transactions would appear to represent a basic
expansion of farmers’ economic rights in land. Rural land users may now
earn income not only from farming land themselves, but also from rent or
other fees earned by subcontracting, subleasing, or otherwise transferring the
land to other parties. This arguably represents the conversion of rural LURs
from “dead capital” to a true form of wealth, fungible and secure, for the
farmers who own them.36
However, two important restrictions continue to straighten the rights
of farming households to monetize use rights in land. The first of these
restrictions comes from the fact that the law does not permit holders of rural
LURs to mortgage the underlying property. 37 The continuing prohibition
against mortgaging rural LURs not only enhances the legal distinction
between property in urban and in rural land, but it also helps support a
difference in value between them.38 A second, and more crucial, restriction
circumscribing the scope of farmers’ rights in land is not actually a
restriction on the LURs owned by farming households; it is, instead, a use
restriction applicable to the underlying land, by virtue of its status as
collectively-owned land. A major condition governing collective ownership
is the principle that the default, and in many cases the only permitted, use of
collectively-owned land is for agricultural purposes.39
Agricultural land may not be converted to other uses without the
approval of the relevant county government.40 National law also restricts the
situations in which such approval may be granted. Article 43 of LAL
provides that entities or individuals who wish to use or build anything on
initiatives undertaken by local governments to encourage the use of market or other efficiency-oriented
mechanisms to effect the transfer of land between agricultural users).
34
RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 32.
35
RLCL, supra note 25, at art. 33; Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28.
36
Zhu Keliang & Prosterman, supra note 5, at 47.
37
See, e.g., Roy Prosterman et al., Implementation of 30-Year Land Use Rights for Farmers Under
China’s 1998 Land Management Law: An Analysis and Recommendations Based on a 17 Province Survey
22 (Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development No. 105, 2000).
38
See Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 29 (testimony of Roy L. Prosterman) (predicting
that allowing the mortgage of rural LURs could be “the beginning of a modern rural banking system”); Ho
& Lin, supra note 25, at 700-703 (describing a dramatic increase in the use of urban LURs as collateral
between 1993 and 1998).
39
Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang tudi tiaokong youguan wenti de tongzhi [Circular on Intensifying
Land Control] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 31, 2006) 30 STATE COUNCIL GAZ. 8 pt. 6 (2006)
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Land Control Circular]; RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 8, 17; RANDOLPH &
JIANBO, supra note 16, at 81-82; Ho & Lin, supra note 25, at 689.
40
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 44.
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land must apply to the state to receive LURs—to state-owned land only—for
this purpose. The article also makes an exception to this presumption for
several categories of builders: rural collectives that seek to construct
facilities for “township-village enterprises” (“TVEs”), which are rural
enterprises owned and managed by local governments;41 farming households
that seek to build housing they will occupy themselves;42 and township or
village governments that seek to build public facilities. However, nonagricultural construction on collectively-owned rural land may not take place
for any other purpose. 43 Peasant households that hold agricultural LURs
may not engage in such construction,44 and, as a general rule, holders of
agricultural LURs to collectively-owned land may not transfer those LURs
to other parties for such construction.45 Some observers46 have pointed out
that the ultimate origins of this proscription lie in Article 10 of the
Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll urban land is owned by the state.”47
If one accepts that all land not used for agriculture, rural government
facilities, peasant housing, and TVEs is “urban,” then, indeed, allowing
other uses on non-state-owned land is unconstitutional.
In summation, private property rights in rural land are not rights of
ownership, which are instead held by the quasi-governmental collective
organization. Instead, these private rights are use rights, created by contracts
between the user and the collective owner, and dependent in part on the
status of the private user as a member of the landowning collective. The
rural rights-holder and the collective owner may not convert the land to nonagricultural uses except in a few specified circumstances. The effects of this
restriction on daily life, livelihoods, and land use in rural China have been
overwhelming.
C.

Requisition and Use Conversion

A rather interesting feature of China’s laws limiting the conversion of
land from agricultural to other uses is that they do not constitute an in rem
41
For more details on TVEs, see, e.g., Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF
PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 297, 310-14 (Dani Rodrik, ed., 2003).
42
Peasant households are not permitted to use more than one parcel for residential construction. LAL,
supra note 25, at art. 62.
43
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 43.
44
RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 17, 60.
45
LAL, supra note 25, at arts. 63, 81.
46
E.g., Zhou Qiren, Professor, Peking University, Nongdi chanquan yu zhengdi zhidu [System of
Property Rights and Expropriation of Rural Land], Speech at Yale University (Sept. 12, 2003) (transcript
available in the China Law Center, Yale University).
47
XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).
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restriction, as it were, that attaches to the land itself. Instead, they are more
in the nature of an in personam restriction: their application depends not on
the location or other characteristics of the land, but on how and by whom the
land is owned. Article 43 of LAL, for example, does not draw a distinction
based on whether or not land is arable. Instead, it stipulates that all new
construction shall happen on state-owned land, unless the construction is of
TVE facilities, farmers’ housing, or public facilities.48 In other words, it is
the fact that land is owned by collectives rather than the state, and not that it
is currently arable, that makes it unavailable for construction except for
those listed uses.
However, Article 44 requires government approval at the county or
higher level for “changes in the use” of “agricultural land,” without
specifying whether or not that land is owned by the state or by a collective.49
Indeed, Article 10 of the Constitution does provide that rural or suburban
land may be owned by the state in exceptional circumstances “in accordance
with the law.”50 Thus, it would seem that a party who wanted to develop
agricultural land for purposes other than TVE facilities, peasant housing, or
public facilities could do so, as long as that land could be moved somehow
from the collective ownership system to the state ownership system.
Approval by the county government would still be required, but the
development would certainly be possible. In fact, this is precisely what is
happening, on a massive scale, in rural China today. Article 45 of LAL
describes the mechanism by which this may take place: “expropriation”
(zhengshou, 征收) of collectively-owned land by instrumentalities of the
state.51 This so-called “expropriation” is rural China’s version of a taking by
eminent domain. However, instead of the government taking ownership
rights from private parties, “expropriation” is the government taking
ownership rights from another quasi-governmental organization—the
collective—and use rights from private parties.
Article 10 of the constitution provides that: “The state may, in the
public interest, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned in accordance with
the law.”52 Like the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
48

LAL, supra note 25, at art. 43.
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 44.
50
XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).
51
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 45.
52
XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.). As this language demonstrates, Chinese law uses both of the
terms “expropriation” (zhengshou, 征收) and “requisition” (zhengyong, 征用). Unfortunately, sources are
not in agreement as to how to distinguish the two terms. One source claims that “expropriation” refers to
the permanent compulsory transfer of land ownership from a collective to the state, while “requisition”
49
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wording of which it evokes, this provision places two major restrictions on
its grant of power to the government to expropriate land.
1.

Public Interest Requirement

The first restriction is that the act of expropriation or requisition may
take place only “in the public interest.”53 However, the phrase “in the public
interest” is not defined in the major documents governing land requisition or
elsewhere in the Constitution. Though this requirement is reiterated in LAL
(“[t]he state may expropriate or requisition land in the public interest in
accordance with the law . . . .”)54 and in the Property Law,55 those statutes
also do not provide any guidance on how to determine whether or not an
expropriation is in fact in the public interest.
It is clear from recent practice, though, that the phrase “in the public
interest” means something broader than “for public use.” 56 Local
governments quite routinely expropriate collectively-owned land and then
promptly transfer use rights in that land to private developers or joint
private-public for-profit ventures. For example, the disturbances in Sanzhou
and Panlong, described above in Part I, both erupted over expropriations that
resulted in the use of the expropriated land by a private apartment developer,
refers to the temporary use of land by the state with the residual interest remaining in the hands of the
collective. Asian Development Bank, Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: The Scope of
Land Expropriation Rights 1 (PRC Thematic Report No. 1, March 2006), available at
http://www.asiandevbank.org/Resettlement/activities/TA6091REG/PRC-Thematic-Report-1.pdf. Another
source asserts that one refers to the taking of land for use by the government entity that takes it, while the
other refers to the government entity’s acquisition of land to be used by a private entity or another
government entity. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 16, at 61 n.6. Many legal documents conflate the two,
under the more general term “taking of land” (zhengdi, 征地). Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu jiakuai tuijin
zhengdi buchang anzhi zhengyi xietiao caijue zhidu de tongzhi [Circular on Accelerating the Establishment
of the System for the Settlement of Land Requisition Disputes by Mediation and Ruling] (promulgated by
the
Ministry
of
Land
and
Resources,
June
21,
2006),
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=5324&keyword=land
requisition
disputes
(P.R.C.); Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu wanshan zhengdi buchang anzhi zhidu de zhidao yijian de tongzhi
[Circular of Guiding Opinion on Perfecting the System of Compensation and Resettlement for Takings of
Land] (promulgated by the Ministry of Land and Resources, Jan. 3, 2004) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2004 MLR
Circular]. Relevant provisions of the LAL seem to use these terms interchangeably. LAL, supra note 25,
art. 45 (using first “requisition” and then “expropriation”). Because it does not appear that the legal
distinction is clear, if it exists at all, this essay will simply use the term “expropriation” to refer to all
takings of collectively-owned land.
53
The language in Article 10 that is translated as “public interest” (“gonggong liyi,” 公共利益) is,
just as it sounds in English, arguably broader than the phrase “public use” found in the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. cl. 4.
54
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 2.
55
Property Law, supra note 14, at art. 41.
56
See Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 19 (testimony of Jacques DeLisle, Professor,
University of Pennsylvania Law School).
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in the former case, and a foreign investor, in the latter.57 It is more or less
taken for granted in China today that takings of rural land frequently occur
for the ultimate purpose of for-profit development, in which the government
entity handling the taking may or may not hold an equity stake.58
An effective distinction between public and private use may be much
more difficult to draw in the Chinese context than in other contexts. Chinese
local governments tend to obtain revenues for their operations in part
through acting as business entities in their own right. TVEs, discussed
above, are a clear example of this tendency. Increasingly, local governments
that expropriate land will act developers of that land themselves before
transferring use rights to a private entity at a profit.59
2.

Compensation Requirement

The second constitutional limitation on state takings of land—that
“just compensation” be paid “in accordance with the law”—is, in contrast,
amply fleshed out in related statutes. The basic requirements come from
LAL. Article 47 requires that three kinds of payments be made when rural
land is expropriated: basic “compensation” payments for the land itself
(buchang fei, 补 偿 费 ), “resettlement assistance” payments for those
individuals occupying the land (anzhi buzhu fei, 安 置 补 助 费 ), and
compensation payments for personal property attached to the land and for
standing crops (dishang fuzhuowu he qingmiao de buchang fei, 地上附着物
和青苗的补偿费).
Precise standards for the amount of each form of compensation are to
be determined by provincial and municipal governments. However, LAL
provides basic guidelines for the first two forms. Basic compensation
payments should be between six and ten times the average value of the
agricultural output of the expropriated land for the three years prior to
expropriation. Resettlement assistance payments are to be determined by
first dividing the quantity of land taken by the figure for per-capita land
57

See supra notes 1 and 2.
See, e.g., Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 44 (prepared statement of Brian
Schwarzwalder et al.) (describing limited survey evidence indicating that around half of rural land takings
are for private commercial purposes); Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 82-83 (asserting that, though takings of
rural land for use by public entities are more frequent than those for use by private entities, the latter remain
common and tend to be of much larger parcels of land); Lin Yan, Nongdi zhengyong dijia buchang de zhidu
genyuan yu xiaolu sunshi [The Origins of and Harm to Efficiency Caused by the System of Low
Compensation for Requisition of Agricultural Land], 2 NONGCUN JINGJI 27, 28 (2004) (P.R.C.) (noting that,
in 1992, 74% of the 200 largest takings of land were for use by private, for-profit entities).
59
Liu Zuoxiang, Chengshihua, nongdi zhengyong yu shidi nongmin liyi buchang [Urbanization,
Farmland Requisition and Compensation to the Farmers], 13:1 CHENGSHI FAZHAN YANJIU 88, 90 (2006).
58

JANUARY 2011

LAND EXPROPRIATION IN RURAL CHINA

83

allocation in that particular collective; this yields the number of individuals
who require relocation assistance. For example, if twenty hectares are taken
from a collective that has 120 peasant members and owns forty hectares of
land, then it will be assumed that sixty individuals require assistance, even if
the actual number is larger or smaller. Payment for each individual assumed
to require assistance should be four to six times the three-year average
annual output of the land taken. The sum of basic compensation and
resettlement assistance payments is capped at thirty times annual average
output.60
It is telling that the value of the land that is taken is determined with
reference to its value for its pre-expropriation (agricultural) use. This
formula implies that rural collectives and peasant households, who are
generally not permitted to use rural land for any but agricultural purposes, do
not have a right to the economic value of potential non-agricultural uses of
that land.
III.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TAKINGS IN RURAL CHINA

Part II’s introduction to China’s system of property in rural land is
intended to provide essential background for understanding the unrest
described in Part I. Specifically, it ought to demonstrate that the problem
giving rise to the unrest is more complex than the bare phrase
“dissatisfaction with the exercise of eminent domain” would suggest,
particularly to the reader most familiar with the implications of that phrase
in the American context.
Government takings of property are never unproblematic. In some
ways, the intense dissatisfaction observed in China seems less explicable
than protests against the exercise of eminent domain in the United States.
Expropriation of rural land in China involves not the transfer of ownership
rights from a private party to a government entity but, instead, the transfer of
ownership rights from one form of government entity to another. The
individuals whose dissatisfaction caused the incidents discussed in Part I had
lost not fee simple ownership rights but, instead, rights to use land for a
limited time and a limited purpose. These rights are connected to some
extent with these individuals’ status as residents of particular villages and
members of certain collectives and have until quite recently been subject to
alteration and amendment on a somewhat regular basis. Most of these
individuals have no experience purchasing or selling these rights on an open
60

Id.
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market and thus probably have a difficult time valuing them so as to derive a
figure against which to evaluate the compensation offered by the
government.
At the same time, there are a number of reasons why the grievances of
Chinese farmers affected by land takings far overwhelm those of an
American citizen who loses a home or business to eminent domain. The
immediately following discussion analyzes in depth the particular
characteristics and effects of Chinese takings that make them the incendiary
phenomenon that they are.
A.

The Expropriation Surplus

Immediately above, I named a number of factors that distinguish the
expropriation of rural land in China from otherwise similar phenomena
elsewhere. More important than all of these factors, however, is the fact that
rural takings in China are not merely a means of affecting a transfer of
ownership. They are also the only means of affecting a change in use.
As discussed in Part II.B., collectively-owned land cannot be used for
purposes other than agriculture, peasant housing, public facilities, or TVE
facilities, without first being converted to state-owned land. Once land is
converted, the array of uses to which it may be put becomes much greater.
In addition, LURs in state-owned land are more completely “commoditized”
than rural LURs under current law:61 the former may be transferred with
less consideration of the identity of the transferee and may be mortgaged.
Thus, it is only reasonable to expect that the value of LURs in two otherwise
identical parcels of land will be significantly higher in a parcel that is stateowned than in one that is collectively-owned. I will refer to this difference
in value as the “expropriation surplus.” In essence, the expropriation surplus
is the product of two separate phenomena: first, the substantial difference
between the price of land designated for agricultural uses and the price of
land on which private commercial construction is permitted (this difference
will be referred to in this article as the “urbanization surplus”); second, a
land use regime that requires expropriation for conversion from the former
to the latter use.
Numerous observers have identified the expropriation surplus, though
not by this precise name, as a major source of tension in the Chinese rural

61
Donald C. Clarke, Incentives and the Bottom-Up Approach to Land Use Regulation in China, Jan.
31, 2000, at 2-3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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takings system.62 The expropriation surplus in rural China results from the
fact that the very process of expropriation of rural land by the state augments
the land with additional development rights (the right to develop the land for
non-agricultural commercial purposes),63 and additional transfer rights (the
right to mortgage the land).
Evidence supports the theory just described; the value of LURs in new
state-owned land is much higher than the “value,” as evidenced by the
statutory compensation system, of that same land when it is collectively
owned. Total compensation payments are generally only a fraction of the
amount of money that the expropriating government receives when it sells
LURs in the expropriated land to new private users.64 In one incident, LURs
to expropriated land in Yunnan Province were sold for 150,000 yuan per mu
(approximately one-sixth of an acre), but compensation to the collective was
only 28,000 yuan per mu, which would indicate that the expropriation
surplus was equal to roughly four hundred thirty-five percent of the
compensation payment. 65 A study in one county in wealthier Zhejiang
Province found that, in one suburban district, agricultural land that was
expropriated for a compensation fee of around fifty thousand yuan per mu
yielded urban LUR fees of around one 1,500,000 yuan per mu.66 A more
ambitious study estimates that only one-twentieth of the price of urban LUR
fees paid for all formerly agricultural land converted since 1979 was paid as
compensation to farmers.67
Of course, one can argue that the expropriation surplus is not entirely
the result of underlying differences in value between urban and rural land.
Instead, it could merely be the result of the fact that the compensation
62

Chengri Ding, supra note 16, at 116; Clarke, supra note 61, at 2-3; Qiren Zhou, supra note 46, at 5-

6.
63

Several commentators have focused on the concept of development rights in their analysis of this
problem. Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, Nongcun jiti tudi fazhanquan de eryuan zhuti ji qi maodun [The
Dual Owners of Rural Collective Land Development Rights and the Contradiction Between Them], 5
NANJING CAIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 24 (2004) (P.R.C.); Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, at 91-92. Their
arguments are discussed in more detail infra.
64
The fees generated by the sale of LURs in urban land are split between the relevant local
government and the central government; 70% of the proceeds go to the former, and 30% to the latter. LAL,
supra note 25, at art. 55; Yue Zhenghua, Wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang zhidu de fumian xiaoying
fenxi [An Analysis of the Negative Effects of the Chinese System of Compensation for Expropriation of
Agricultural Land], 2005:9 NONGCUN JINGJI 30, 32;. One little-discussed and potentially positive effect of
widespread expropriation is the extensive contribution it makes to certain local government coffers.
65
Id. at 51. In this particular case, only 9,000-10,000 yuan per mu of the total compensation was
actually distributed to farmers who had lost their LURs.
66
Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 28. Of the 50,000 yuan paid in compensation to the collective, only
20,000-30,000 yuan was distributed to farmers.
67
Hou Huali & Du Juan, Tudi fazhanquan yu nongmin quanyi de weihu [Land Development Rights
and the Protection of Farmers’ Interests], 11 NONGCUN JINGJI 78, 79 (2005) (P.R.C.).
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figures are hardly trustworthy proxies for the actual value of collectivelyowned land; after all, they are set unilaterally by the party seeking to acquire
that land. The unilateral nature of “transactions” by eminent domain means
that they are a very poor indicator of the market value of property that
changes hands through them. It is undeniable that a government entity that
both expropriates land and sets the compensation has a strong motivation to
keep the compensation low.
However, I will argue that this factor is not the sole source of the
expropriation surplus. First, the method for determining compensation for
rural land in China is arguably less open to manipulation than the methods
used in other regimes—it is based on one factor (recent average annual
agricultural income) that is relatively verifiable. Second, articles and
research describing the unrest arising from rural takings virtually always
compare the compensation distributed to farmers to the sums paid to the
expropriating government by the new user, not to the average annual
agricultural income on which compensation is supposed to be based.68 If
local officials were in fact manipulating the statutory formula in order to
depress compensation, one would expect that protesting farmers, who know
how much agricultural income they have earned from their land in recent
years, would point to the difference between the figures yielded by the
statutory formula and the actual compensation paid.
All in all,
circumstantial evidence indicates that the expropriation surplus is not
entirely created by arbitrary actions of local officials seeking to depress
compensation in violation of the statutory formula.
One could still argue, though, that the statutory compensation formula
underestimates even the true value of LURs in land that is limited to
agricultural use, and that this underestimation contributes more to the
expropriation surplus than any inherent difference in the value of land used
for agriculture and land usable for other purposes. However, very rough
calculations show that, though the statutory formula probably is set too low,
this fact by itself does not explain the full extent of the expropriation surplus.
One can assume, for example, that the truly fair value of thirty-year use
rights in agricultural land is the discounted value of the income foreseeable
from that land over thirty years. For convenience’s sake, that figure can
simply be set at thirty times the average annual agricultural output of the
68
E.g., Beech, supra note 2 (“[C]ompensation per mu . . . would amount to about $100 a year, even
though the factor was paying $3,300 per mu [for rights to the expropriated land]”.); Cody, supra note 1
(“[T]he complaint voiced most often by farmers [is that] local officials pocket the difference between low
compensation paid to farmers and the high market price charged to developers.”); sources cited supra notes
64 and 65.
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past three years; this assumes, generously, that the annual rate of growth of
the output value will suffice to cancel out whatever the appropriate discount
rate is, and that the thirty-year term of the present LUR holder has just begun.
In keeping with the statements of a prominent Western commentator on the
subject, one can also assume that the value of thirty-year LURs constitutes
around eighty-five percent of the value of fee simple ownership of collective
land limited to agricultural use.69 Thus, it would seem that the full fair value
of a parcel of land that is restricted to agricultural use is roughly thirty-five
times the average annual income it generates.70
The statutory compensation formula provides for six to ten times the
average annual agricultural income to be paid as basic compensation, and for
a maximum of fifteen times the average annual income to be paid for
resettlement assistance. The sum of these two payments is capped at thirty
times annual output. From this latter fact, it is clear that compensation
payments will always fall short, sometimes far short, of the fair value of the
agricultural land as estimated above. It is fair to assume, for example, that
total payments are frequently as low as twenty (eight for basic compensation
payment, twelve for resettlement assistance) times the average annual
output—less than sixty percent of the estimated fair value. Even so, this
discrepancy—between statutory compensation and compensation that more
closely approximates fair market value—pales in comparison to the
discrepancy frequently observed between compensation paid and the resale
value of LURs in the land once it is urbanized. In the examples given above,
which are by no means atypical, the latter discrepancy was a factor of four,
in one case, and a factor of close to thirty, in the other. Even if the statutory
compensation formula yields a figure that is less than sixty percent the fair
market value of the land when it is used for agriculture, it is still clear that
the land is worth significantly more to those who would and can use it for
non-agricultural purposes than to those who can expect nothing more from it
than the value of its agricultural output.
This analysis is, as mentioned above, based on very rough estimates
and a good deal of guesswork. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that the
expropriation surplus is created by several factors: the motivation and
ability of local officials to keep compensation on the low end of the statutory
69

Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 22 (testimony of Roy L. Prosterman).
Obviously, the comparisons done here would be much more meaningful if the fair value of a parcel
of agricultural land were determined using the actual amount paid for rural LURs that are circulated
through market transactions, as described supra, Part II.B. Unfortunately, to the best of this author’s
knowledge, no data is available comparing the value of rural LURs exchanged through market transactions
with either the amount of compensation later paid for those same LURs or the selling price of urban LURs
in the same land post-expropriation.
70
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formula; the difference between the values yielded by the statutory
compensation formula and likely estimates of the value of rural land based
on its agricultural yield; and the difference between the value of rural land
devoted to agricultural use, and the value of the same land devoted to
another commercial use. The first two factors are a function of the fact that
expropriation is an involuntary transfer of property rights to the government,
and of the legal system surrounding such transfers. The third factor, which
is at least as substantial, is not the direct result of the fact that expropriation
involves an involuntary transfer of property rights. It is, instead, a result of a
change in the land use regime applicable to the land in question.
B.

Effects of the Current Expropriation System

The anecdotes in Part I constitute circumstantial evidence that
something is wrong with the Chinese legal regime surrounding the
expropriation of rural land. This Section will expand on that hypothesis by
attempting to describe the mechanisms through which the system goes
wrong. Scholars and other observers have tended to emphasize five major
destructive effects of the regime; this Part will review each of these in turn
and evaluate the relative role each may play in rendering the regime
dysfunctional. Throughout this discussion, the concept of the expropriation
surplus will provide a useful analytical framework.
1.

Waste or Inefficient Use of Land

Canonical analyses of American takings jurisprudence have identified
the pursuit of “efficiency” as one primary goal of compensation for
government expropriation of private property.71 Some efficiency analyses of
compensation systems focus on those systems’ influences on the behavior of
private actors,72 but the majority focus on their influence on the behavior of
governmental actors. One kind of inefficiency that results from a nonoptimal compensation system is described thusly: “[i]f the government were
71

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (Aspen 5th ed. 1998); Michael A. Heller &
James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998; Thomas J.
Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 749, 750 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
72
For example, it has been suggested that the failure to compensate for physical takings distorts the
market behavior of individuals who are risk-averse and have no way to insure against the risk of losing
their property, without compensation, to the government. Lawrence Blume & Daniel J. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 584-89 (1984).
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free to take resources without paying [or without paying enough] for them, it
would not feel incentives, created by the price system, to use those resources
efficiently.”73
Indeed, at first glance the American efficiency analysis seems readily
applicable to the takings problem in rural China. Critics of the Chinese
expropriation system do frequently assert that it enables the devotion of
expropriated land to uses other than its highest and best use.74 By arranging
for the expropriation and use conversion of agricultural land, local
governments essentially get money for nothing. The difference between the
total price paid by a private developer for LURs in newly-urbanized land
and the portion of that price that is designated as compensation represents
almost pure profit for an expropriating government; only the (presumably
low) administrative costs of arranging the transaction prevent the amount of
profit from equaling the full expropriation surplus. Local governments
therefore can afford to be less demanding about the prices they charge for
LURs in newly-urbanized land. This in turn means that developers may
obtain these LURs at bargain prices that allow inefficient uses of the land.
A contrasting but related possibility created by the expropriation
surplus is that local governments might expropriate land without an eventual
transferee in mind. If compensation is low enough and the potential
expropriation surplus is high enough, a government may determine that it is
well worth its while to expropriate land even in the face of the risk that no
buyer of LURs to that land will appear. For example, if there is only a
twenty-five percent chance that a buyer will be found who is willing to pay
five times the amount of compensation—by no means an unrealistic figure
in these sorts of transactions—then a local government’s expected return on
its “investment” (the amount of compensation) is still one hundred percent.
The most pernicious variation on this phenomenon would be the total
non-use of expropriated land. Private transferees may find it expedient to
73
Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 999. American efficiency analysis of takings law has been
criticized for sometimes facilely and inaccurately equating local governments with market actors and
ignoring the fact that the incentives of those governments are more closely related to voter support and
political demands than to monetary revenues and outflows. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 417 (2000); see also
Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 72, at 621 (“[T]he argument for compensation cannot possibly correct any
‘across the board’ fiscal illusion problems.”). In the Chinese context, though, the equation of government
actors with profit-oriented private actors seems more defensible: local governments are not directly elected
and tend to prioritize fiscal concerns. E.g., Stein, supra note 15, at 59 (identifying the conflict between the
central government’s concern with social stability and local governments’ focus on generating revenues as
a major source of tension in rural land policy).
74
Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 670-71; Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, at 91; Zhou Qiren, supra
note 46, at 12.
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leave land purchased at bargain prices temporarily idle; this state of affairs is
said to have been quite common in the early 1990s, in the wake of extensive
conversion of agricultural land.75 Local governments may be unable to find
purchasers for expropriated land. This phenomenon is widespread enough
that a phrase (zhengerbuyong, 征 而 不 用 ) that plays on a word for
expropriation (zhengyong, 征用) has been coined to describe it.76
There is a very convincing logic to the argument just made.
Unfortunately, that argument is based largely on hypotheticals; there is only
limited empirical evidence demonstrating that the expropriation system leads
to projects that utilize land inefficiently. The coining of a phrase to describe
the phenomenon of expropriated land lying unused seems reasonably
reliable evidence that this does occur with some frequency, but quantitative
proof of that phenomenon’s prevalence is hard to obtain. In fact, there is an
argument that the very existence of the expropriation surplus indicates that
most expropriations cannot be that inefficient. If land is worth significantly
more under an urban use regime, then there must be a net social benefit
stemming from its transfer, even if that transfer does not result in the
optimally efficient use. Moreover, the observation above that Chinese local
governments behave more like market actors than do American local
governments would seem to reduce the likelihood that Chinese local
governments will dedicate land to less efficient uses. Since Chinese local
governments are, on the whole, more likely to be single-mindedly concerned
with revenues than an American governmental actor (who may be interested
in political donations or voter support), they are likely to grant LURs in
newly expropriated land to the highest bidder, who in turn should
presumably be the most profitable user.
These concerns all point to the conclusion that the actual event of
expropriation is less of a source of inefficiency than the underlying land use
regime that makes it profitable—that is, the regulatory division between
agricultural and non-agricultural use. In fact, there is evidence that the
current demand for state-owned, developable land far exceeds supply, and
that the opposite is true for collective, rural land available for transfer for
agricultural uses.77
In other words, the efficiency analysis of takings compensation, when
applied to the system of expropriation of Chinese rural land, leads only to
ambiguous conclusions. There is a powerful theoretical argument that the
75
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Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 670-71.
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incentives of local governments are skewed by the expropriation surplus in
the direction of excessive, inefficient expropriation. However, there is also
an argument that, if anything, too little expropriation takes place, despite the
incentives created by the expropriation surplus—that expropriation is, in
essence, an efficient response to inefficient regulatory restrictions on the use
of collective land. In the absence of extensive empirical evidence, it is all
but impossible to choose between these two arguments. This failure of a
classical “efficiency” analysis to yield a clear evaluation of China’s
expropriation system only highlights the importance of the effects of that
system that are discussed immediately below.
2.

Demoralization Costs and Civil Unrest

The “efficiency” analysis of takings compensation, described above,
is concerned only with whether governments are forced to pay sufficiently
for land, not with whether the individuals from whom land is taken are
sufficiently compensated. Michael Heller and James Krier distinguish
between the “distribution” and “deterrence” functions of compensation for
takings:
while the “deterrence” function merely requires that the
government pay for what it takes, so that it will have incentives to make
efficient use of it, the “distribution” function is dependent on payment
actually being made to parties who lose property. 78 The expropriation
surplus is the difference between the money paid and the money received by
local governments in the process of land expropriation; it has nothing to do
with the portion of the money paid to evicted farmers. In fact, the
expropriation surplus could be eliminated without increasing payments to
evicted farmers at all.
This most definitely does not mean that the amounts actually paid to
dispossessed farmers are unimportant, though. Perhaps the single most
obvious effect of the current compensation system, and the effect which
needs the least proof or explanation, is the serious damage to social stability
that the system has done in recent years. All of the instances of civil unrest
described in Part I are illustrative. In those instances, and a good many
others like them, the main complaint of the aggrieved farmers who
participated in the unrest was not the fact that their land had been taken at all,
but was instead that the compensation offered them was too low.79
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Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 999-1001.
See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; Ho & Lin, supra note 25, at 706.
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The frequency with which rural land expropriation leads to violent
expressions of dissatisfaction by villagers indicates that the compensation
system has failed to achieve another major goal for such systems: “justice”
or “fairness.”80 While efficiency concerns respond mainly to the variable of
how much is paid for expropriated property, the justice of a taking depends
just as much on the party to whom those amounts are paid.
However, the line between the justice failings of China’s
compensation system and its efficiency effects is not particularly clear or
impermeable. Simply put, the justice failings can aggravate any potential
efficiency failings. A groundbreaking article by Frank Michelman, which
inspires Heller and Krier’s justice and efficiency analysis, proposes that
justice—or “fairness,” in Michelman’s terminology—failings in a takings
regime are a source of concern in part because they produce “demoralization
costs.” Michelman defines demoralization costs:
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which
accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the
realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present
capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either
impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization of
uncompensated losers . . . 81
In other words, the failure to compensate parties sufficiently leads to
inefficiencies unrelated to the specific takings transaction for which
compensation might be due. These inefficiencies are likely to have nothing
to do with the level of efficiency with which the property at issue will be
used; instead, they will redound to the broader social and economic context.
They may result from the fact that the undercompensated parties and those
who sympathize with them feel less secure in their tenure in their own
property, 82 or they may be the direct result of the resentment felt by the
undercompensated parties, which may be expressed in destructive “social
unrest.” This second hypothetical is, of course, especially relevant to the
Chinese context. One scholar, who theorizes that the current takings system
may actually be economically efficient insofar as it eliminates the
negotiation costs that would be required for developers to acquire land by
80
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 216-17 (Harvard
University Press 1995); Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 999; Michelman, supra note 71; Stephen R.
Munzer, Compensation and Government Takings of Private Property, 33 NOMOS 195, 199-200 (1991).
81
Michelman, supra note 71, at 1214.
82
Id. at 1211-12, 1214.
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other means, eventually concludes that these added efficiencies are
outweighed by the long-term detrimental effects on China’s economy that
result from takings-related social unrest.83
Seen from this perspective, the analysis in the first paragraph of this
Part seems specious: the failure to compensate individuals does produce
efficiency effects. These are related to demoralization costs and, while more
diffuse and more difficult to measure, may also be more broadly and
lastingly destructive than, say, the systematic under-use of land. Unlike the
inefficiencies that might be expected to result from underpayment by
governments and developers, the destructive social unrest that results from
underpayment to Chinese farmers is empirically observable.
Several related analyses that focus on the inefficiency of unfairness
point to a new way of understanding the effects of the expropriation surplus.
Mark Roe has proposed that economic systems that maximize total wealth in
the short-term, but distribute that wealth in a radically and visibly unequal
way, may eventually give rise to “wealth-decreasing political instability”
that could render the systems themselves unsustainable and certainly do
render them inefficient in the long run.84 Another case study suggests that
perceived inequity in transactional terms can delay and increase the costs of
completing even transactions that would otherwise produce “large ex post
aggregate gains.” 85 These analyses support the demoralization costs
approach insofar as they share the assumption that social dissatisfaction and
unrest can be wealth-decreasing.
However, they also point to the role of inequalities, as opposed to
simple under-compensation, in creating demoralization costs.
The
expropriation surplus represents a very visible inequality: farmers receive
compensation for their land at one value and then see local governments
resell the land at another. In other words, the problem with the expropriation
surplus may not simply be that it induces governments to expropriate,
thereby resulting in the demoralization costs that result from low
compensation. Instead, the expropriation surplus may also directly increase
demoralization costs, by creating an appearance of inequality. 86 This
83

Xiaobo Zhang, Asymmetric Property Rights in China’s Economic Growth 17-18 (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
84
Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217 (1998).
85
Gary D. Libecap, Chinatown: Owens Valley and Western Water Reallocation: Getting the Record
Straight and What it Means for Water Markets, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2088-89 (2005).
86
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
934, 948 (2003) (“The very fact that the [United States] Constitution allocates 100% of [the] condemnation
surplus to the condemnor, or the private beneficiary of the condemnation as the case may be, may itself be
demoralizing for a property owner.”).
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observation is related to the observation that “givings” by governments to
select parties can generate just as much demoralization among those not
selected for “givings” as takings can.87
Another approach, compatible with, but different from, the
demoralization costs approach, provides another reason to worry about the
perceived unfairness of the current compensation system. Henry Smith and
Thomas Merrill have argued that utilitarian law-and-economics approaches
to property rights, such as the “efficiency” analysis of takings discussed in
Part III.B.1. above, are unsatisfactory because they ignore the extent to
which ethical imperatives structure the law and social expectations of private
property. 88 Moral assumptions, according to Smith and Merrill, help to
coordinate the behavior of individuals so that property systems can function:
“[p]roperty can function as property only if the vast preponderance of
persons recognize that property is a moral right.” 89 In the absence of a
system of widely-recognized moral assumptions surrounding property,
violation of property rights will be rampant, for the simple reason that legal
and self-help enforcement of these rights will always be insufficient to
protect an in rem right that must be defended against an unlimited number of
potential violators. 90 In China, where a functional system of private
property is still in its formative stages, wide recognition of property as a
moral right could be especially valuable in this coordinating role. Yet, to the
extent that individuals perceive under-compensated takings of agricultural
land as a violation of a farmer’s moral rights to land she possesses and farms,
such takings are likely to weaken this recognition. To the extent that the
internalization of a property right’s consciousness will help to increase
overall prosperity in China, such takings are therefore likely to represent a
drag on total wealth.91
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Id. at 1850.
Id. at 1854-55.
This analysis of takings is different from Merrill and Smith’s understanding of the moral
assumptions governing the use of eminent domain in the American context. Merrill and Smith focus on
how the exercise of eminent domain for certain purposes offends these moral assumptions even when full
and fair compensation is paid. Id. at 1879-1884. However, as will be discussed infra Part IV.A., American
moral and legal assumptions about the various purposes for which the eminent domain power may be
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Loss of Agricultural Land

Expropriation of rural land represents a change not only in ownership
of land but also in its use; therefore, China’s land use regime is as crucial a
factor in these transactions as are those aspects of its legal system that deal
specifically with expropriation. A common criticism of the interaction of
these two systems is that the expropriation regime undermines the goals of
the land use regime.
As discussed in Part II.B., above, Article 43 of the LAL forbids the
use of collectively-owned land for any but a few limited purposes. Multiple
other articles of the LAL emphasize a commitment to controlling the pace of
conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses. For example,
Article 31 provides that there should be no net loss of agricultural land—any
agricultural land that is developed must be offset by the reclamation of an
equal amount of new land for agricultural use, either by the developer or by
local governments.92 The Property Law reiterates this concern as well.93 A
2004 Circular from the State Council focuses specifically on measures to
protect the supply of arable land, 94 and a 2006 Circular from the State
Council reiterates the government’s concern about the too-rapid
development of farmland.95 For most observers, the Chinese government’s
interest in “halt[ing] or at least retard[ing] the conversion of arable land to
non-agricultural uses”96 and in “protect[ing] environmental and agricultural
lands” is a given.97
This policy appears to originate at least in part with environmental
and land-use planning principles. According to one scholar, ensuring
security of the food supply is a major goal of the policy. 98 Ironically, the
major concern motivating the government in recent years may be worry
about the social side effects of displacing farmers from their land. This
concern is integrally tied to a fairly paternalistic view of Chinese farmers as
subject to exploitation in market transactions. If agricultural land could be
freely traded for other uses, the reasoning goes, unscrupulous speculators
92
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94
Guowuyuan guanyu jiang bufen tudi churangjin yongyu nongye tudi kaifa youguan wenti de
tongzhi [Circular on Relevant Issues Concerning Using Part of the Land Transfer Fees for the Expansion of
Cultivated Land] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=3484&keyword= (P.R.C.).
95
2006 Land Control Circular, supra note 39, at preamble.
96
Clarke, supra note 61, at 1.
97
Chengri Ding, supra note 16, at 113. See also Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28.
98
Stein, supra note 15, at 32-33.
93

96

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 1

and developers could persuade farmers to sell at prices that would be unfair
to the farmers. 99 That reasoning is certainly at odds with the market
orientation that has guided most reforms of the Chinese rural land regime
over the past several decades, but it may be the inevitable result of the
current political calculus in that country, by which, for example, leftist
commentators were partially responsible for delaying the passage of the new
Property Law.100
Prohibiting most development of collectively-owned land at first
glance might seem like a reasonable strategy in light of these concerns.
However, the fact that expropriation rescinds this prohibition for any given
piece of land, coupled with the existence of the expropriation surplus, dooms
the strategy to failure. Not only do local governments have the means to lift
this prohibition on land within their jurisdiction, they have a substantial
financial motivation to do so. The act of expropriation both transfers a piece
of property into the government’s hands and raises the value of that property,
by opening it up to a wider array of uses. By restricting the potential uses of
collectively-owned land, the national government sets the stage for that rise
in value and provides incentives for local governments to engage in
expropriation. The end result—conversion of agricultural land to other uses,
and the displacement of farmers, often resulting in social unrest—is
precisely what the rural land use restrictions were originally intended to
avoid, hence the irony noted above.
A number of scholars have already identified the problem just
described. 101 Several scholars have also used the term “monopoly” to
describe the position held by local governments in this process. The idea is
that local governments are the only parties that can engage in the valuecreating activity of changing the permitted use of a piece of land.102 While
the analogy of local governments to monopoly sellers may be useful, it may
99
Id. See also Pranab Bardhan, Land Acquisition Must Be Humane, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at 11
(“History is replete with instances of uninformed, cash-strapped peasants induced to sell their land at
nominal prices. . . . In the bargaining process, thousands of small, uncoordinated (sic) farmers are no match
for large corporate buyers.”).
100
See, e.g., Richard McGregor, Property Reform Ignores Chinese Farmers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007
(“The value of the [new Property L]aw can also be judged by the opposition it created among the old-style
leftists . . . . [Because of leftist influence, t]he bill also explicitly rejects any change to the system of
‘collective’ ownership of rural land, where farmer occupiers have only usage rights over limited contract
periods . . . .”).
101
Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 670-71; Yue Zhenghua, supra note 64, at 32; Clarke, supra note
61, at 2-3; Zhou Qiren, supra note 46, at 5-6.
102
Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 28; Zhou Qiren, supra note 46, at 9. See also Nelson Chan, Land-Use
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(1999); Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 289 (both using the term “monopoly” to describe urban local
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overstate the extent to which the Chinese land use regime is unique in this
regard. Land use restrictions, after all, are always created by, and can only
be changed or relaxed by, governments. Nor is the fact that local
governments have strong financial motivations to allow certain use changes
unique to the Chinese context. U.S. local governments, for example,
frequently engage in varieties of “fiscal zoning,” which subordinates stated
land use goals to the pursuit of the government’s own financial health.103 Of
course, in the case of the United States, the government’s fiscal motives are
much more attenuated, based as they are on the projected (but never entirely
certain) effects of a given land use decision on property tax revenues. In
China, by contrast, a substantial portion of the vast differences between the
value of a parcel of land under agricultural restrictions and the value of that
same parcel after those restrictions are removed goes directly and
immediately into the pockets of local governments. Nonetheless, this
comparison is a useful reminder that the expropriation problem in rural
China is as much a problem of land use controls as an eminent domain
problem.
The power of the expropriation surplus is such that the array of
government measures to halt or retard the conversion and net loss of
farmland have been largely ineffective. Between 1986 and 1995, China lost
more than 1.9 million hectares of farmland to construction and urban
expansion, and by 1995 per capita farmland was down to 1167 square meters,
well below the world average of 2333 square meters.104 One study estimates
that the supply of arable land is decreasing at a rate of one percent a year.105
These statistics indicate that Article 31 of the LAL, requiring that all
converted agricultural land be replaced, is an ineffective counterweight to
the expropriation surplus, perhaps because it is poorly enforced or
compliance is impossible in many instances.
In summation, the expropriation surplus is the product of the
interaction of the country’s system of laws pertaining to land use and its
laws pertaining directly to expropriation. That interaction ends up
undermining the key goal of the former set of laws—ensuring the
preservation of agricultural land—and, in turn, aggravating the problems—
displacement of farmers and rural unrest—that are part of the inspiration for
103
E.g., Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS (1975);
Audrey G. McFarlane, Redevelopment and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 22 J. L. & POL’Y 33,
39-40 (2006) (“‘fiscal zoning’ means that the structure of land use regulations are not based on the physical
impact of uses on each other, but rather the impact . . . of uses on [taxable] property values”).
104
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that goal in the first place. The empirical question of how much agricultural
land China needs from a land use perspective does not need to be answered
in order to determine that the loss of such land is a problem to the extent that
rural unrest produces the demoralization costs described in Part III.B.2.
above.
4.

Insecurity of Tenure and Underinvestment in Agricultural Land

A number of Western scholars, most of whom are affiliated with the
Seattle, Washington-based Rural Development Institute (“RDI”), have dwelt
on one particular negative effect of the current expropriation system: that it
undermines the perceived security of Chinese farmers’ tenure in the land that
they farm, thereby discouraging investment in that land and hindering
agricultural productivity growth.106 This effect constitutes a subset of the
demoralization costs described in Part III.B.2.—a clear example of
Michelman’s “impaired incentives.”107
Two separate causal mechanisms would seem to link expropriations to
reduced agricultural investment. First, the mere fact that expropriation is
fairly common reduces farmers’ incentives to invest. A second, and closely
related, factor is that the statutory compensation formula is unlikely to take
into account the effects of recent investments, particularly more long-term
investments, on the future output of agricultural land. 108
These two mechanisms in turn point to different features of the
expropriation system as sources of the problem. The first mechanism is
intimately related to the expropriation surplus, insofar as that surplus creates
incentives for local governments to engage in frequent expropriations. It is
also dependent on the second mechanism—if compensation were sufficient
to reimburse farmers for all investments in agricultural productivity, then
expropriation would not reduce the incentives for such investments.
The second mechanism is not so closely related to the expropriation
surplus but instead is related to the absolute amount of compensation paid to
individual farmers. This amount is likely to fall short for any investments
that do not constitute fixtures on the land (and hence not covered by the
fixtures and standing crops payments) and that are either quite recent or for
106
Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 13; Zhu Keliang & Prosterman, supra note 5. But see
Hanan R. Jacoby, Guo Li & Scott Rozelle, Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in
Rural China, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1420, 1444 (2002) (empirical study finding that tenure insecurity in
China does not have a substantial effect on forms of investment in land that matter greatly to overall
agricultural productivity).
107
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other reasons were expected to yield benefits in the years following the
expropriation that are not reflected in agricultural productivity in the three
years immediately prior to the expropriation.
5.

Violations of Related Laws

Illegal land uses and transactions are widespread throughout both
rural and urban areas; “legal transactions constitute only a part, albeit a
majority, of all land use transactions.”109 One very common subcategory of
these violations of law is the “illegal use of collectively owned land by rural
commercial users.” 110 The prevalence of such illegal use, I will argue,
constitutes both an index and a destructive effect of the rural land
expropriation system’s failures.
As discussed in Part II.C., expropriation is required for the conversion
of agricultural land to most other uses, and the use of collectively-owned
land for most commercial purposes is illegal. Yet it takes place with striking
frequency 111 and is especially common at the fringes of large, growing
cities.112 The participants in this sort of illegal land use are most likely to be
urban commercial users, and the collective landowners who transact with
them to allow the illegal use. For example, a rural collective might pay
peasant households to relinquish their LURs in cultivated land and then
contract with a commercial user who will pay the collective for the right to
develop the land. 113 In other cases, a collective might pay peasant
households to relinquish their LURs and then enter into a joint venture with
a commercial user to develop the land, claiming an equity stake in the
project rather than rent from the commercial user.114
In other cases, collectives do not even bother partnering with an urban
commercial user but instead simply develop land they have reclaimed from
peasant users, at a price, on their own and retain all the profits.115 It appears
that, in at least some situations of this sort, the collective passes the lion’s
share of the profits on to its peasant members, who may enjoy a very good

109

Ho & Lin, supra note 25, at 696.
Id. at 696.
111
See Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Property Seizure in China, supra note 8; Che Yubin, supra note
110

33.
112

Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 86.
Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 86; Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, at 26.
114
Che Yubin, supra note 33, at 86.
115
Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, at 26.
113

100

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 1

living from these proceeds.116 In still other cases, the party transacting with
the urban commercial user might be a township-village enterprise (“TVE”).
As discussed above, TVEs are the only parties permitted to use collectivelyowned land for commercial purposes. 117 A TVE might find it more
profitable, however, to subcontract or otherwise transfer its LURs in
collectively-owned land to a non-TVE commercial entity at a relatively high
price, and evidence suggests that numerous TVE managers succumb to this
temptation.118
What all the illegal transactions just described have in common is that
they allow non-state land users to bypass the expropriation system, and, in
so doing, to obtain a portion or all of the expropriation surplus that is
usually retained by the state in use conversion-expropriation transactions.
For example, in the first form of transaction, all parties may be willing to
participate, despite the transaction’s illegality and attendant risks, because
each gets to enjoy a portion of the expropriation surplus that would
otherwise be claimed by the state. Unfortunately, though understandably, no
empirical evidence exists to demonstrate how parties to such transactions
share the pilfered expropriation surplus among themselves. It is entirely
possible, for example, that peasant users actually receive very little or none
of the surplus through the sums paid by the collective for cancellation of
their LURs, because they either are unaware of or lack the means to enforce
their statutory rights to retain those LURs for the duration of their thirty-year
term.119
Like many black markets, the prevalence of illegal transactions
suggests that the underlying system of rules is not wealth-maximizing.
Parties find it more profitable, it seems, to allocate rights among themselves
outside of the legal channels for doing so.120 All this demonstrates once
116
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again the importance of the expropriation surplus in the current legal regime,
and the extent to which the expropriation surplus is created by the land use
regulations governing collectively-owned land—after all, the laws being
violated above do not pertain specifically to the expropriation process but
instead to the permitted uses of collective land. The efficiency problem
indicated by this illegal behavior here is a land use problem, not an eminent
domain problem.
This illegal behavior exacerbates drawbacks of the current system
even as it serves as an index of them. First, the presence of a black market
in land hinders the development of transparent, efficient markets in, and
pricing mechanisms for, land. 121 Second, the fact that rural collectives,
commercial users, and farmers may reap profits, extensive in some cases, by
violating existing laws can only contribute to the demoralization costs
described in Part III.B.2. If scholars are able to identify instances of illegal
commercial use of collective land, then surely residents of neighboring
villages and an array of commercial developers are aware of this
phenomenon as well. If a peasant loses his land via expropriation and
receives only statutory compensation, knowing that others in a comparable
position have received compensation that is closer to the value of the land
for commercial uses, his demoralization is likely to be greater than it would
have been absent this knowledge.
IV.

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Part III.B. identified five major potential negative effects of the
current system surrounding the expropriation of rural land. The conclusion
that emerges from that discussion is that the system is economically
destructive, but not perhaps in the way that a facile application of many
efficiency-oriented American takings analyses would suggest. The problem
is not that the ability to expropriate land at currently prevailing levels of
compensation necessarily leads to expropriation for inefficient purposes.
Instead, the inefficiencies of the underlying land use regime lead to frequent
expropriation, and low levels of compensation in turn lead to wealthdestroying social unrest, to insufficient investment in agricultural land, to
illegal activity that possibly heightens general dissatisfaction, and perhaps to
represent subtle support for the demoralization costs argument made in Part III.B.2, above. Demoralization,
and the likelihood of social unrest, is likely to increase with the value of the entitlement that is taken away.
Local governments may recognize a greater likelihood of social unrest when they take not just agricultural
rights in land but rights to a share in the expropriation surplus, and may tread with caution as a result.
121
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the retardation of the process of building a functional property rights
consciousness in China.
The expropriation surplus, discussed in Part III.A., therefore comes to
seem like something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it induces
what may be the fundamentally efficient act of transforming less valuable
collective land into more valuable state-owned urban land. However, to the
extent that that transformation’s fundamental efficiency is overwhelmed by
the destructive effects just named, the expropriation surplus is problematic.
Part V will argue that the most direct way to mitigate these destructive
effects is to eliminate the expropriation surplus by separating the economic
consequences of urbanization from the administrative process of changing
the ownership and use status of rural land. First, however, this Part will
consider several other frequently-proffered solutions and will show that
these solutions are unlikely to be effective on their own.
A.

Strengthening the “Public Interest” Requirement

Some observers have urged the Chinese government to improve the
expropriation system by strengthening or further enforcing the “public
interest” requirement found in Article 10 of the constitution. 122 These
observers generally propose that the government should have the right to
expropriate land through non-negotiated transactions, without the consent of
current owners or users, but only when the land is being taken for a
legitimate public use,123 and that current owners or users should have the
right to challenge acts of expropriation on the grounds that they are not in
fact in the public interest. 124 This would represent a major, indeed
revolutionary, change to the current system; as was discussed above, the
public use requirement is not currently defined or elaborated upon anywhere
in Chinese statutory law, and the reality is that expropriation of land for
profit-bearing development by private entities is extremely common.125
122
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See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text; see also Theresa Wang, Comment, Trading the
People’s Homes for the People’s Olympics: The Property Regime in China, 15 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J.
599, 616 (2006) (pointing out that terms like “public purposes” or “public necessity” are necessarily
ambiguous in an officially Communist country).
123

JANUARY 2011

LAND EXPROPRIATION IN RURAL CHINA

103

Under these proposals, which are favored by affiliates of the U.S.based RDI, 126 the state would be forced to purchase collective land at a
mutually agreed-upon price if it planned to use the land for purposes other
than the public interest. The most difficult question is, of course, how
“public interest” should be defined. The best option would almost certainly
be a detailed statutory definition of the phrase. RDI proposes limiting the
use of land in “the public interest” to the construction of infrastructure
projects with clear public benefits, such as power plants, government
buildings, and highways, and to projects with broader “economic
development” benefits, but only with the approval of the State Council.127
The major problem with this proposal is that it grants the State Council
substantial definitional discretion. The national government is entitled to a
portion of the expropriation surplus (thirty percent of the fees generated by
transferring LURs to private parties) in all expropriation transactions.128 The
State Council therefore would have an incentive to deem projects to be in the
public interest so as to reduce the amount of compensation paid, assuming
that the statutory formula will yield a lower figure than negotiation. All in
all, though this proposal would eliminate the potential for the worst local
abuses, it could mean that the number of expropriation transactions at the
current compensation levels, and the resulting demoralization costs and
reduced incentives for farmers, might not be substantially reduced from the
present state of affairs. 129
A variation on the RDI proposal, in which economic development
projects could not be deemed in the public interest with State Council
approval, and only public infrastructure projects could be designated as such,
would eliminate this potential conflict. However, it is telling that the RDI
did not choose to propose such a restrictive definition of “the public interest.”
American commentators, including the RDI affiliates and the author of this
Article, may have little moral authority to propose such a definition. After
all, American courts have ruled that even the narrower-sounding phrase
“public use” can include vague public goods like economic development and

126

Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 46, 52 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et

al.).
127

Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 46 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et al.).
LAL, supra note 25, at art. 55; Yue Zhenghua, supra note 64, at 32.
129
The RDI proposal also involves raising the statutory formula for compensation for projects
deemed to be in the public interest. Id. at 52. However, that portion of the proposal, as will be discussed
infra Part IV, seems unlikely to eliminate the expropriation surplus to the extent necessary to substantially
mitigate the current system’s problems.
128
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beautification, 130 and can encompass projects that generate substantial
benefit for private parties.131 Indeed, the American interpretation of “public
use” even encompasses the generation of increased tax revenues for local
governments. 132 It is difficult to argue that this principle does not extend to
the potential conclusion that the expropriation surplus is itself in the public
interest, as it enriches the coffers of state entities that exist ostensibly to
serve that interest.
Finally, one more point that should not be overlooked is that proposals
to strengthen the public use requirement might not sufficiently address the
demoralization costs and impaired incentives that result from too little
compensation being paid to peasant land users. After all, the especially
deadly incident of civil unrest in Dongzhou resulted from the expropriation
of land for a public works project (a power plant).133
B.

Increased Compensation

It would seem that the most direct way to reduce both the
expropriation surplus and demoralization costs from takings is to increase
the amount of compensation paid to collectives and farmers in fulfillment.
However, most proposals for doing so to date are either of dubious
effectiveness or liable to create as many problems as they solve.
1.

Fair Market Value Compensation

An interesting contrast emerges when one studies the different
proposals for reforming the compensation system offered by Western and
Chinese observers. Almost uniformly, Western scholars advocate the
replacement of the current statutory compensation formula with a
requirement that farmers receive the fair market value of their rights in
130

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (upholding the exercise of eminent domain
for “economic rejuvenation”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (upholding the exercise of
eminent domain for a program of slum clearance and aesthetic improvement). But see County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786-87 (Mich. 2004) (holding that incidental economic benefit resulting from
private business development is not a valid public use under state constitutional law). See also Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovksy, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (arguing
that a public use requirement on eminent domain without compensation makes governments more likely to
abridge property rights through regulatory means); Joseph L. Sax, Kelo: A Case Rightly Decided, 28 U.
HAW. L. REV. 365, 369 (2006) (arguing that distinguishing between public and private uses is increasingly
difficult even in the American context).
131
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485-87; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984).
132
E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (citing “new jobs and increased tax revenue” as “benefits to the
community”).
133
See Lethal Attack, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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expropriated land.134 Chinese observers also commonly recommend that fair
market value be taken into consideration in any new standard135 but are, in
general, more likely to recommend that the compensation also be designed
with an eye toward maintaining farmers’ current standards of living.136 One
or both of these two concerns inform most proposals for compensation
reform; unfortunately, both of these concerns can be somewhat unproductive.
Advocates for a fair market value compensation system proceed quite
reasonably from the assumption that such a standard will bring
compensation as close as possible to duplicating the effects of a voluntary
transaction. Additionally, “fair market value” seems, particularly from an
American perspective, an accessible, tried-and-true standard, which has been
used, to non-disastrous results, to compensate for takings both in the United
States and under several international systems for years.137
However, fair market value compensation is unlikely to solve the
expropriation problems in rural China. First, that standard will probably not
come close to eliminating the expropriation surplus. The prototypical fair
market value proposal seems to assume that the market value will be
determined only with reference to the uses currently permitted on the land
by applicable law.138 That is, at any rate, how the standard is applied in the

134
See, e.g., Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 52-53 (prepared statement of Brian
Schwarzwalder et al.). This proposal, made by affiliates of RDI, asserts that fair market value should be
the baseline compensation standard but that a higher multiple of annual average agricultural output may be
used instead if the market value of land cannot be discerned. In addition, as this proposal would require
negotiated prices for all transfers of collective land to the state for non-public purposes, the fair market
value compensation standard would apply only where land was taken for public purposes. Id. at 46. See
also Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 294 (advocating that “fair market value” be the compensation standard for
takings of urban land use rights).
135
Guo Dexiang, Lun wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang zhidu cunzai de went [Discussion of the
Problems with China’s Current System of Compensation for Expropriation of Agricultural Land], 185
JIGUAN JINGJI YANJIU 98, 98 (2005); Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong, Wo guo nongdi zhengyong buchang
zhidu wenti tantao [Exploration of Problems with the Chinese System of Compensation for Expropriation
of Agricultural Land], 2 SHAANXI NONGYE KEXUE 117, 118 (2005); Zhou Qiren, supra note 46, at 24.
136
Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98; Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59,
at 91; Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong, supra note 136, at 118.
137
See Thomas Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 110 (2002)
(discussing the export of the fair market value standard used in American federal constitutional
jurisprudence to the North American Free Trade Association’s takings law).
138
Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 52 (prepared statement of Brian Schwarzwalder et al.).
But see, e.g., Yin Shibo & Yu Dan, Jianli fuhe shichang jingji guize de zhengdi buchang anzhi xin zhidu
[Establishing a New System for Expropriation Compensation and Resettlement that Conforms to Market
Principles], SHANGCHANG XIANDAIHUA, Oct. 2005 (proposing that compensation be at fair market value of
the land if all commercial development uses were considered). Yin Shibo and Yu Dan’s article and similar
proposals will be discussed infra, Part IV.B.
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United States139 and for takings in urban China.140 Yet a sizable portion of
the expropriation surplus is contributed by the difference between the land’s
value under the use restrictions associated with collective ownership, and its
value once those restrictions are removed. Therefore, incentives for local
governments to expropriate will remain. 141 If fair market value
compensation leads to higher compensation, some of the demoralization
costs of the current system might subside; but, to the extent that those costs
arise from the perceivable inequity between the prices paid and received by
local governments, these costs will remain.
Second, critiques of fair market value compensation standards in nonChinese contexts resonate with the problems currently present in the Chinese
system, and suggest that fair market value compensation will fail to reduce
demoralization costs substantially. It has been noted that fair market value
in a takings context is essentially a “fiction”: the officials who set
compensation have no way of knowing what price the owner of a given
piece of property might actually have demanded in a voluntary
transaction.142 Fair market value is defined as the price that a willing seller
and willing buyer would have reached through negotiation; but, like fair
market value itself, the price demanded by a willing seller is an uncertain
variable.143 Fair market value compensation, at least as applied in the United
States, ignores all individualized value property may have for its owner,
including lost future profits, business goodwill, subjective or sentimental
value, and costs of relocating.144
A third, and perhaps the least debatable, objection to the fair market
value standard is that it is most likely impossible to apply effectively in the
139
E.g., Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1973);
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16-17, 21 (1970); United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S.
624, 639 (1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943).
140
See Wilhlem, supra note 16, at 265-66.
141
In all fairness, the RDI proposal does attempt to answer this objection by allowing involuntary
takings only for public purposes, perhaps on the theory that this restriction will eliminate the expropriation
surplus. Supra note 134. However, for reasons discussed supra, Part III.B.2., this measure is unlikely to
remove the expropriation surplus effectively or entirely.
142
Merrill, supra note 138, at 116.
143
Nathan Burdsal, Note, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 79, 9193 (2005).
144
Merrill, supra note 138, at 118-19. See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY
35-71 (University of Chicago Press 1993); Garnett, supra note 86, at 947 (on the “uncompensated
subjective loss” from takings); Ann E. Gergan, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 181, 201 (1993). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political
Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104 (suggesting that American scholars have tended
to “overstate the undercompensation problem” and that relocation assistance requirements may outweigh
any undercompensation resulting from the failure to include subjective value in fair market value
calculations in the United States).
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current Chinese context. While a market in agricultural LURs has been
developing since the 1990s, that market remains relatively immature.145 It is
not clear when or whether market data will exist sufficient to allow reliable,
objective determinations of fair market value for agricultural land.
Moreover, fair market value is a vaguer standard than the standard currently
used and, as such, is more subject to discretion and abuse by decisionmaking officials.
2.

Social Safety Nets

Standing in rather sharp contrast to the fair market value proposals is
the emphasis, frequently seen in Chinese articles on the subject, on ensuring
that compensation guarantees farmers a standard of living equivalent to that
which they enjoyed before expropriation.146 Fair market value proposals are,
at least ostensibly, geared toward duplicating the effects of market
transactions, whereas standard of living proposals treat land use rights not as
a market commodity, but as a social safety net. Related to this standard of
living emphasis are proposals that stress that farmers should not be given the
compensation they are due as a one-time cash payment but should instead
receive annuities from special funds or even in-kind forms of compensation
like shares or jobs, which are presumably more likely to constitute a longterm, non-squanderable form of social security.147
Much more than the fair market value emphasis, the standard of living
emphasis has been tentatively welcomed by the Chinese government. As
was discussed above, both the Property Law and a 2004 Ministry of Land
Resources circular reiterated a commitment to the maintenance of farmers’
standard of living, as did the Decision on Major Issues.148 However, this
emphasis can only go so far toward curing the system’s present pathologies.
First, as was the case with fair market value proposals, these proposals will
not do much to eliminate the expropriation surplus and, hence,
demoralization costs that derive directly from the perception of inequity that
it causes. Farmers’ standard of living is, after all, based on agricultural
145

Stein, supra note 15, at 43; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98; Lin Yan, supra note 58, at 29; Wang Youqiang & Dong Hong,
supra note 136, at 119.
147
Fu Shiming & Wang Yong, Zhengdi buchang biaozhun de shiwu qiquan fenxi [An Options
Analysis of Expropriation Compensation Standards], 11 DANGDAI CAIJING 5, 9 (2005) (P.R.C.); Lin Yan,
supra note 58, at 29; Yin Shibo & Yu Dan, supra note 139. For a discussion of the issues and dynamics
associated with stream-of-payment rewards in lieu of lump sums in the American tort law context, see
Henry E. Smith, Structured Settlements as Structures of Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 1953 (2002).
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2004 MLR Circular, supra note 52; Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28.
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income, which is dramatically lower in absolute terms than returns earned on
industrial or commercial enterprises.
It is estimated that current
compensation levels are generally sufficient to support displaced farmers for
seven to ten years following an expropriation.149 Even if compensation were
multiplied by a factor of five, so as to provide thirty-five to fifty years of
support at a pre-expropriation level, they would still fall far short of the
sums to be earned by converting land to commercial use.150
Second, it is also quite likely that merely providing enough
compensation to duplicate farmers’ previous income levels will not ensure
their economic support once they have lost their land. What the impressive
size of the expropriation surplus illustrates so vividly is the massive
economic gap between urban and rural China. Once land moves from the
rural to the urban economy, its value increases drastically because returns
from non-agricultural pursuits far outstrip those from agricultural pursuits.
Accordingly, average urban income is over three times the average rural
income in China. 151 Therefore, even compensation that successfully
duplicates entirely the income from expropriated agricultural land is not
likely to support a particularly comfortable life for farmers who decide or
are forced to move to an urban area after losing their land, or who might lose
their land as part of a process by which their village is incorporated into the
urban economy of a nearby city.152
Chinese law does, in fact, recognize the impossibility of converting a
rural social safety net into a decent urban livelihood. It is perhaps for this
reason that governments have been urged to provide occupational training,
non-agricultural jobs, or urban residence permits (which carry with them a
wide array of social services, among them educational and health
entitlements, not available to rural residents) in lieu of cash as resettlement
assistance. The idea behind these measures is to provide displaced farmers
not with the (rural) standard of living they enjoyed before expropriation but,
perhaps, with a standard of living that is roughly analogous to their former
standard in an urban context. However, a recent survey has shown that
farmers increasingly prefer cash to jobs or urban residence permits as
compensation.153 It is not difficult to guess why: promised salaries are often

149
Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98 (estimating seven years); Dai Zhongliang & Yang Jingqiu,
supra note 63, at 26 (estimating ten years).
150
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
151
Property Seizure in China, supra note 8, at 12 (statement of Roy L. Prosterman).
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This point has been made by Liu Zuoxiang, supra noteError! Bookmark not defined. 59, at 91.
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Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 666, 676.
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diverted, and favoritism or corruption sometimes interferes with the
provision of job opportunities or other in-kind assistance.154
All this points to a third reason why the “former standard of living”
approach to compensation may be ultimately unproductive and may in fact
cause as many problems as it solves. Attempts to guarantee a certain
standard of living indefinitely, and particularly attempts to do so through
mechanisms other than one-time cash payments, put farmers at the mercy of
notoriously corrupt local governments and hamper the development of free
markets in rural land and labor. Taken too literally, this standard threatens
to enhance the role of the state in the rural economy and hearkens back to
rural China’s history of more intensive economic planning.155 These effects,
in turn, might both increase opportunities for corruption and resulting social
unrest, and decrease the likely efficiency of land use and economic ventures
in rural areas. They also run counter to the prevailing trend in rural land
reform in the last few years, which has emphasized the strengthening of
economic incentives and market factors in rural economies and lifestyles.156
V.

ELIMINATING THE EXPROPRIATION SURPLUS, PRESERVING THE
URBANIZATION SURPLUS: TRANSFERABLE LAND DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS

This Part will present an alternative proposal for reform. This
proposal, which is inspired by, but more elaborate than, suggestions offered
by several Chinese scholars, is not merely a proposal for raising
compensation. Instead, it is a proposal for creating and monetizing land
development rights. As such, it recognizes that the current “takings”
problem in rural China is as much a land use problem as an eminent domain
problem; and it seeks to fulfill the two potentially, but not necessarily,
conflicting goals of enhancing economic efficiency and distributive justice
in the rural land economy.
A.

Decoupling the Urbanization Surplus from Expropriation

Reducing or eliminating the expropriation surplus might seem the
logical foundation of a proposal to fulfill those goals. After all, eliminating
the expropriation surplus would eliminate the incentive of local governments
154
155
156

Id. at 666, 669-70.
Guo Dexiang, supra note 136, at 98.
See supra Part II.B.
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to expropriate and the demoralizing impression of inequality among
condemnees. However, as was hinted at in Part III.B.1., the very existence
of the surplus probably indicates that there is a shortage of buildable land
and an excess of land designated for agricultural use in China today. To the
extent that the surplus induces parties to move rural land to a more profitable
use, it serves a positive function.
A more productive approach stems from recognition of the fact,
touched upon in Part III.A., that the expropriation surplus is actually the
product of two phenomena: the existence of an urbanization surplus (that is,
an increase in the value of land that results from its conversion from rural to
urban uses), and a land use regime that does a very poor job of meeting its
ostensible goals of controlling the pace of urbanization and preserving
agricultural land. On its own, the urbanization surplus is a positive factor: it
represents the value generated by economic development.157 At present, the
restrictions on the use of collective land mean the urbanization surplus can
only be enjoyed as a result of the expropriation process. If the urbanization
surplus can be detached from the expropriation process, the expropriation
surplus will diminish.
B.

Recognizing Current Land Use Restrictions as a Regulatory Taking

Recognizing the potential value of separating the urbanization surplus
from the expropriation process, several scholars have proposed that the
difference between the land use restrictions applicable to state-owned and
collective land simply be eliminated. In theory, this would require a
constitutional amendment (to Article 10) and would allow collectives and
farmers to enjoy the urbanization surplus by transferring LURs freely to
commercial users. It would also validate a plethora of illegal practices
which, at this point, are quite common.158 Several scholars have proposed
this fairly radical solution,159 with one noting that it will break a pernicious
“monopoly” by local governments on the land conversion process.160 Also,
quite surprisingly and apparently in defiance of Article 10, in 2005 the
provincial government of Guangdong adopted a pilot program that
essentially allows the circulation of collectively-owned land for a wider
array of private construction uses, so long as that construction complies with
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other relevant land use laws.161 The city of Shanghai is reported to have
launched a similar program for collective land within its boundaries as
well.162
The problem with this approach, as discussed above, 163 is that it
ignores the fact that all alterable land use regulation represents a government
monopoly over a potentially lucrative process, and that the benefits of this
monopoly, in a healthy land use regime, are generally seen as outweighing
its costs. In this case, the Chinese national government has evinced a
genuine concern with restricting the conversion of agricultural land to other
uses. Questioning the validity of that concern is not within the mission of
this analysis, and in fact few scholars appear to have ventured such
questioning. The collective/state ownership dichotomy has become its
major tool for accomplishing this goal. Eliminating the restrictions on
collective land would require the drafting of a new system of land use
controls, and any new system would inevitably disadvantage the economic
rights of farmers, just as the current one does. This is the case because of a
fundamental fact about land use regulation: where governments seek to
preserve or compel a certain less-profitable use of land (and most land use
161
Guangdong sheng jiti jianshedi shiyongquan liuzhuan guanli banfa [Administrative Measures of
Guangdong Province for the Circulation of Use Rights to Collectively-Owned Construction Land] art. 4
(promulgated by the People’s Government of Guangdong Province, June 23, 2005, effective Oct. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=4436&keyword= (P.R.C.).
As
potentially revolutionary as the Guangdong Measures are, they fall short of a comprehensive solution of the
expropriation problem for several reasons. First, the Measures specifically do not allow the development of
collectively-owned land for commercial housing, one of the more lucrative potential uses. Id. art. 5.
Second, and most damningly, the Measures note that collectively-owned construction land will remain
subject to expropriation by the state but do not address the question of how compensation should be
determined in these cases. Id. art. 9. Presumably the current statutory model, based on agricultural output,
would be irrelevant and unworkable. If compensation were calculated through a formula analogous to that
currently used for agricultural land—that is, based on average income from construction uses for the three
years preceding the expropriation—ample potential for under-compensation would exist, as many new
development projects would likely take much longer than three years to reach a level of profitability
sufficient to justify initial investment. Finally, it is not clear that these Measures would allow individual
farming households to enjoy any profits from the increased range of permissible uses; the Measures appear
to envision a situation in which farmers’ LURs are still contractually limited to agricultural uses, and only
collective owners are permitted to extract higher rents from commercial users. The Measures require that
half of the proceeds from selling construction LURs in collective land shall be deposited in an account
designated for the provision of social security benefits for collective members, which of course raises the
question of what collective leaders are likely to do with the other half. Id. art. 25.
162
See Stein, supra note 15, at 44-46. Certain language in the Decision on Major Issues suggests an
interest on the part of the Chinese Communist Party in permitting commercial development on rural land
(expressing support for “approving non-public-use building projects on collectively-owned agricultural
land” and for “gradually establishing unified markets for urban and rural land”). Yet that document also
expresses a commitment to maintaining the amount of agricultural land at current levels, and to “not
changing the collectively-owned nature or the current use” of agricultural land subject to market
transactions in land-use rights. Decision on Major Issues, supra note 28.
163
Supra Part III.A.
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regulation seeks to do precisely this), they are bound to impose outsized
burdens on the owners of land currently designated for such use. In this way,
Chinese farmers and collectives are no different from the unlucky owners of
undeveloped open space in American jurisdictions that have made a priority
of preserving that particular land use.164
This comparison suggests another way of thinking about the
expropriation problem: the harm to farmers of the current system does not
actually originate with the expropriation process but is instead at least
partially a result of the burdens that the current land use regulation system
imposes on them in order to provide benefits to the rest of Chinese society.
The recognition of these burdens clearly inspires proposals to revamp the
current land use regulation system altogether; but those proposals ignore the
benefits that these land use regulations seek to provide. 165 The best solution,
therefore, may not be to eliminate the system entirely but instead to seek to
mitigate its effects. For these ends, the doctrine of regulatory takings can
prove extremely useful.
The import of my reference to the doctrine of regulatory takings
should not be misunderstood. Under American constitutional law, it is a
mandatory requirement that officials compensate citizens for regulations
that completely or unfairly diminish the value of their property.166 No such
requirement exists in Chinese law. My application of regulatory takings
theory here is not a legal analysis. Rather, it is a policy analysis. As such, it
takes its cue from analyses of American regulatory takings doctrine that
justify that doctrine as much with reference to universally desirable
functions such as “efficiency” and “justice” as with reference to American
constitutional law. My conclusion is not that compensation for a regulatory
taking is currently necessary under Chinese law; instead, it is that such
compensation is desirable from a prudential standpoint.
Both Frank Michelman’s canonical analysis of takings jurisprudence
and Heller and Krier’s expansion on that analysis received attention in Part
III.B., above. These scholars’ perspectives were used in part to understand
the negative effects of the current expropriation compensation system. In
fact, though, neither analysis originated as an attempt to understand the
optimal compensation due when property is taken by eminent domain.
164

See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counc., 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
It is true that the benefits of those regulations are dampened somewhat by the ongoing process of
expropriation and urbanization of rural land. However, to the extent that the proposal in Part V of this
Article reduces the expropriation surplus, that proposal furthers the preservation of agricultural land and the
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Instead, both analyses are focused more on the questions that are integral to
the doctrine of regulatory takings—the question of how much compensation
is due is secondary to the question of whether a taking has occurred, and
whether any compensation is due at all.167
The purpose of the regulatory takings doctrine, according to Heller
and Krier, is to ensure both efficiency and justice in the administration of
government programs that burden particular individuals. It was established
above that the current system of compensation for expropriation of rural
land—comparable to takings by eminent domain—falls short in the justice
area. This is due in substantial part to the expropriation surplus, which is in
turn created by the land use regulations applicable to rural land. The key
question now is whether those regulations also fail to serve those same goals
and hence constitute a regulatory taking.
Heller and Krier present the efficiency of any government policy as a
threshold question for determining whether or not the entity promulgating
the policy should be required to compensate those constituents who bear its
costs. The idea is that a compensation requirement will serve a deterrence
function with respect to governments, ensuring that they will institute such
costly measures only when the benefits of doing so truly outweigh the costs.
168
For reasons discussed above, this Article will not take the position that
the urban/rural divide with respect to land policy is an inefficient measure
that should be discouraged by a payment requirement imposed upon the
Chinese national government, which is responsible for that divide. For one
thing, evaluating the relative benefits and costs of that policy is well beyond
the purview of this piece. For another, the policy certainly seems a
reasonable response to a concern for the preservation of agricultural land
(even though the expropriation system undermines the value of that
response), and once that concern becomes a policy goal, it is unavoidable
that any implementing measure would disadvantage the users and occupiers
of the land that is sought to be preserved.
The fairness of the urban/rural distinction, however, is readily
susceptible to analysis here. In American jurisprudence on regulatory
takings, a concern with fairness or justice usually manifests itself as a focus
on two issues: first, the extent to which a regulation diminishes the value of
private property; 169 second, the way in which a regulation distributes the
burdens and benefits of a particular government policy among different
167
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citizens or interest groups.170 The first issue is of little interest here: the
Chinese policy does not render collectively-owned land completely
valueless, nor does it actually reduce the value of agricultural land from a
previous higher level. Instead, it merely prevents a certain degree of
appreciation of value, at least while that land is in the hands of its current
owners. However, the second issue strikes precisely at the heart of what
renders these restrictions so troublesome.
The distinction between state-owned and collectively-owned land is
starkly unfair in its distribution of burdens and benefits among various
members of Chinese society. First, the basic benefits of preserving
agricultural land—environmental impacts and security of the food supply—
accrue to the entirety of society, but only rural citizens bear the burdens.
The expropriation surplus created by this distinction only enhances this
imbalance, because expropriation generally results in an additional windfall
for private developers—presumably non-farmers—who purchase rights to
newly expropriated land at bargain prices. One could question this analysis
by pointing to the way in which, in recent years, Chinese commentators have
cited preserving the livelihood and well-being of farmers and other rural
residents as an argument for preserving farmland through these
restrictions.171 However, as discussed above,172 that argument looks quite
weak given the ability of local governments to expropriate. Picking up on
other themes raised above, the most productive way of viewing this situation,
given the expropriation possibility, might be to treat local governments as
constituents of the central government just as individual land users are. The
current land use regulations coupled with the law of expropriation
essentially give local governments an option on the urbanization surplus.
This represents a clear benefit to these entities, and that benefit is
simultaneously a burden on collectives and the farmers they represent.
Second, the current regulations restrict the potential use of land based
not on its current use, as many land use restrictions do, but on the basis of
who owns it. Even non-agricultural land may only be developed by a limited
range of parties or for a limited range of purposes if it is owned by
collectives rather than the state. Finally, the restrictions burden a class of
citizens—farmers and other rural residents—whose incomes and access to
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E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Supra Part III.B.1.
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social entitlements are, despite their numbers, markedly less than those of
urban residents.173
Can a regulatory regime whose main fault is an unfair distribution of
burdens and benefits constitute a regulatory taking? American regulatory
takings jurisprudence would likely answer that question in the negative,174
but American constitutional doctrine should not be the touchstone here.
According to the policy-based analysis of Heller and Krier, a significant
failing of American regulatory takings jurisprudence is that it has failed to
“uncouple” efficiency concerns from justice concerns in determining when a
taking has occurred.175 Compensation for takings serves a dual purpose. On
the one hand, forcing governments to pay for certain regulations discourages
inefficient government action. On the other, assigning payment to aggrieved
citizens ensures fairness in the distribution of the burdens and benefits of
regulation. Yet, there is no reason why a given regulation must require both
payment by the government and payment to burdened citizens. According to
Heller and Krier, situations may occur in which payment by the government
is necessary to ensure efficiency, but distribution of those payments to
citizens would entail more administrative costs than it might be worth.
Conversely, in other situations, efficiency concerns that would justify
payment by the government may not exist, but aggrieved citizens may still
be entitled to compensation.176
This analysis is uniquely applicable to the distinction in Chinese land
use law that creates the expropriation surplus. This policy is unfair but does
not lend itself to an efficiency analysis. It is hard to find a compelling
reason why this policy, instead of many others, should require payment by
the government. It does, however, create unfair distinctions among Chinese
173

In the United States, the size of the affected group is often treated as an index of its political power
and thus as inversely related to its vulnerability to regulatory takings. However, in a non-voting-based
political system like China’s, that assumption is not valid. E.g., Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just
Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 305-06 (1990).
174
The American rule is that regulations that physically invade an owner’s land or render that land
valueless are regulatory takings. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Regulations that do neither may still be takings based on a more ambiguous
balancing test that, however, does not emphasize distribution of burdens and benefits and instead focuses
on the character of the government action and its economic impact on the landowner. Penn Central Trans.
Co., 438 U.S. at 123-29.
175
Heller & Krier, supra note 71, at 997.
176
Id. at 999-1005. Heller and Krier divide all regulations into four categories, two of which are not
currently recognized by American courts. The two which are recognized by American courts are those that
do not constitute a taking and for which no compensation is due, and those that do constitute a taking and
for which compensation is due. The two remaining categories, which Heller and Krier urge courts to
recognize, are takings for which no compensation is due, and non-takings for which compensation is due.
Id.
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citizens for which some compensation ought to be paid. This policy is a
regulatory taking insofar as compensation is owed to citizens, but it is not a
taking for which compensation by the government is owed. This is a novel
category, to be sure, and one that does not properly exist in American
takings jurisprudence, though there is some evidence that this category is
recognized by German courts.177
How can Chinese farmers be compensated for the use restrictions on
collective land without payment by the Chinese government? In Part V.C.,
below, I propose that compensation for farmers who bear this land use
burden should consist of transferable development rights that, at least up
front, will not cost governments anything to provide.
C.

Compensation for Regulatory Takings

The discussions above point to two major goals for pre-expropriation
(regulatory takings) compensation for Chinese farmers. First, because a
deterrence analysis based on efficiency does not yield a clear verdict on the
Chinese land use system, one cannot assert that governments should have to
supply the compensation that is due. Second, that compensation should be
designed so that, when actual takings—expropriation of collective land—do
occur, the urbanization surplus should not fall entirely or mostly into the
hands of local governments; instead, some of it should end up instead in the
hands of farmers. The regulatory takings analysis in Part V.B. answers the
vexing question of why farmers deserve a portion of the
expropriation/urbanization surplus: although they do not generate the
economic development that produces the surplus, they generate value in
other (involuntary) ways, through compliance with economically onerous
land use restrictions.
A crucial remaining question, though, is how much of the
urbanization surplus should go to each of farmers, collectives, local
governments, and developers. Were it not for the dual ownership system,
and the requirement that the state intervene by expropriating land whenever
land is to be converted from rural to urban uses, farmers, collectives, and
developers might arrange for that division themselves, through market
transactions. An ideal system would be one that allowed, to the greatest
extent possible, simulation of the results of market transactions. The
following proposal may accomplish just that.

177

Id. at 1012 n. 63.
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Create, By Statute,Transferable Rural Land Development Rights 178

1.

Rural land development Rights (“RLDRs”) do not represent the
current right to develop land. Instead, they represent the right to develop the
land if it is converted to state ownership and, consequently, becomes subject
to the less restrictive land use regime.
The RLDRs will attach only to collectively-owned land that is
currently being used for any purpose, either by the collective owner or
pursuant to rural LURs. They will also attach to formerly unused
collectively-owned land as soon as it is converted to some sort of use.
2.

Assign RLDRs, by Contracts Similar to Those Used for Rural LURs,
to the Current Users of Collective Land

Collectives will receive RLDRs for every parcel of land they are
currently using for public facilities or TVE facilities. Meanwhile, farming
households will receive RLDRs to accompany each piece of land to which
they hold use rights for either agricultural use or their own housing.
It is only rational that land users (farmers) rather than owners
(collectives) receive RLDRs. RLDRs are essentially a form of use rights—
the right to use newly-expropriated land for the sorts of purposes reserved to
state-owned land. Moreover, farmers and not collectives, which are not
even legal persons under Chinese law, are the parties directly harmed by
national law’s distinctions between the permissible uses of collective land
and the permissible uses of state-owned land. RLDRs represent an
appropriate form of compensation for the regulatory taking that is imposed
upon rural citizens by that distinction—appropriate in part because they
move the system away from one of ad hominem land use regulation. With
RLDRs, collective agricultural land will be unavailable for development by
virtue of the fact that it is currently used for agriculture, as is the case today;
however, it will not be the case that its current (agricultural) users are denied

178

This proposal is by no means entirely original. Several Chinese scholars have in recent years
offered proposals for reform that are based around the granting of rural land development rights to farmers.
None of these proposals are as detailed as this one, however, nor are any identical to it. Dai Zhongliang &
Yang Jingqiu, supra note 63, at 27 (proposing that LDRs be granted only to non-agricultural collective land,
and that upon expropriation LDRs be included in the compensation formula rather than purchased by new
commercial users); Hou Huali & Du Juan, supra note 67, at 78-79 (offering a less detailed proposal very
much like this one, but excluding the possibility of market sales of RLDRs outside of the expropriation
context); Liu Zuoxiang, supra note 59, at 92 (arguing that farmers should be given LDRs to the land that
they currently use but proposing no detailed mechanism for doing so).
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any share in the potential surplus that will be generated if the land is
converted to urban uses.
3.

Establish, Through Amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, and the
Property Law, for the Sale and Possibly the Mortgage of RLDRs

Provisions for the market circulation of RLDRs should resemble those
for rural LURs. All transactions must be reported to local governments, and
the price paid must be included in the reports.
While the introduction of a transferable abstract right in land into a
relatively unsophisticated rural economy may sound a bit cumbersome, in
fact such a process is likely to be easier and smoother in rural China than
elsewhere. After all, transferable LURs have been a feature of the Chinese
rural economy for years now, and recent data shows that market transactions
in these rights have been increasing in number in recent years, thus
indicating an increasingly widespread understanding of these rights.179
The hope is that this reform will lead to a market in RLDRs to
collective land that is not certain or even expected to be expropriated in the
near future. For instance, the purchase of RLDRs to land in a village that is
not far from an expanding major city may strike speculators or developers as
a potentially lucrative gamble. These speculators or developers might then
bargain with farmers or collectives who would prefer to earn cash in the near
term. Then the speculators or developers could turn a profit if the land were
expropriated in the future, and would likely sustain a loss if the land were
never expropriated. This would allow farmers to monetize their RLDRs
even if their land remains in the collective system indefinitely.
4.

RLDRs Required for Development

It should be established, through amendment of the LAL, the RLCL,
and the Property Law, that land that is currently collectively-owned may not
be developed for commercial purposes, including for TVEs, rural housing,
and public facilities, unless the developer holds RLDRs in that land. This
will mean, for example, that a collective seeking to build a TVE or public
facility may not reclaim agricultural land from a farmer who holds LURs in
that land without first purchasing the farmer’s RLDRs. While collective
reclamation of land for these purposes ought not to be a major problem at
present, given that collectives are forbidden by law from violating LUR
179

See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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contracts except in special circumstances,180 this provision will still provide
an extra line of defense for farmers against unscrupulous or abusive
collectives.
5.

Endurance of RLDRs Despite Expropriation

It should be established, through amendment of the LAL, the RLCL,
the Property Law, and possibly an amendment to Article 10, that RLDRs
may not be expropriated by the state except in cases in which the land to
which they attach is simultaneously expropriated for public, non-profit
purposes, 181 and that, unlike rural LURs, RLDRs are not extinguished when
collective land is expropriated.
6.

Expropriation for Non-Public or Profit-Bearing Purposes

Local governments may still expropriate land for profit-bearing
purposes, as there will still be no other legal means of changing the use
regime applicable to that land. However, the rights expropriated, or
extinguished by expropriation, will not include RLDRs. Local governments
must compensate farmers and collectives according to the statutory formula
and may then sell LURs to commercial users. However, these same
commercial users must also purchase RLDRs from their holders before they
will be permitted to develop the land.182 Similarly, if local governments
expropriate collective land for commercial development in which they will
180
RLCL, supra note 25, at arts. 14(1), 27. Contracts may be altered only if the land is damaged by a
natural disaster, and even in these cases alterations must be approved by two-thirds of villagers’
representatives and by both the township and county government. Id. at art. 27. See also Property Law,
supra note 14, at arts. 131-132; LAL, supra note 25, at art. 14; Land Contract Law Aims to Protect
Farmers
Interests,
PEOPLE’S
DAILY,
June
27,
2001,
available
at
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200106/27/eng20010627_73603.html.
181
Even in such cases, compensation for the expropriated RLDRs will be required, as is discussed
below.
182
One potential concern here is that these transactions may occur against a backdrop of unequal
information between farmers and developers. For example, developers may persuade local governments to
agree to expropriate land but not to publicize their plans to do so until after the developers have purchased
all the RLDRs they need. This may allow the developers to obtain the RLDRs at a lower price than farmers
would have accepted had they known that the expropriation of LURs was certain to occur and thus that the
developers needed, and were not simply speculating on, the RLDRs. This is a legitimate concern. But it is
one that is hard to answer without measures that will limit farmers’ rights to sell and bargain for their
RLDRs as they choose. Moreover, if information about markets in RLDRs spreads relatively easily, there
is a good chance that the overall effects of this phenomenon will be neutral for both farmers and
developers/speculators, as farmers will begin to demand higher prices for RLDRs whether expropriation
plans have been made public or not, and the price of RLDRs in situations where no expropriation plan
exists and the purchase is purely speculative will rise.
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be a main participant (either by developing the land themselves or by acting
as a joint venture partner), they will be required to negotiate a price for the
RLDRs with their current holders.
This portion of the proposal serves several goals at once. First, it
assures that the elimination of the expropriation surplus will not completely
deprive local governments of what has been a particularly valuable source of
income for their operations. Local governments are still free to earn a profit
off of expropriation, by charging new users a higher price for urban LURs
than what they were expected to pay under the statutory compensation
formula.
At the same time, though, this process should ensure that the
expropriation surplus will be reduced. New users of newly-urbanized land
will need to buy RLDRs from their current holder before they will be able to
develop their land. This decreases the expropriation surplus, which will
presumably make local governments less likely to expropriate, reduce the
rate of peasant displacement (in keeping with the stated goals of the dual
land ownership regime), and possibly, to the extent that local governments
do expropriate more frequently than is efficient or optimal at present, bring
more market discipline into the process. 183
Moreover, in a sense, this process allows the market to determine the
amount by which the expropriation surplus will, and should, be reduced.
Private commercial developers will need to pay two prices—one to gain
basic rights to a parcel of land, the other to gain the right to develop that
parcel for a particular use. Public or semi-public (public-private joint
ventures) developers will need to pay the second price only (on top of the
statutory compensation due to collectives upon expropriation). The relative
prices that commercial developers will be willing to pay for LURs and
RLDRs will provide potentially useful information to governments and
market participants about the fundamentals underlying land prices in China
today.
7.

Expropriation for Non-Profit Public Purposes

Local governments would still be permitted to expropriate collective
land for any of an enumerated list of non-profit public purposes, including
183
If in fact the rate of expropriation does go down, or if the prices developers are willing to pay for
newly urbanized land decrease due to the requirement that they separately purchase RLDRs, then it is likely
that a key source of local government revenue will be reduced. On the other hand, there is also a chance
that local governments will be able to make up some of the difference by charging higher prices to
developers. In any event, the reduction of this revenue stream is a side effect of any proposal to shift some
of the expropriation surplus to farmers or to reduce the pace of rural expropriation.

JANUARY 2011

LAND EXPROPRIATION IN RURAL CHINA

121

construction of government buildings, power plants, highways, and state-run
schools. Compensation for the lost ownership rights of collectives, and the
lost agricultural LURs of farmers, would be required based on the existing
statutory formula.
However, in addition, compensation will also be required to
compensate land users for their temporarily unexercisable RLDRs. Ideally,
this compensation should consist of a new set of RLDRs, in a parcel of
comparable size to that expropriated, located in the same village, if possible,
or the same county, if not. This option may not be available, however, as
RLDRs to all comparable land may already be assigned to other users. Thus,
barring the availability of this option, compensation should be the fair
market value of the RLDRs. In the absence of extensive market data, fair
market value determinations will be by no means easy to make in the first
few years of the system’s operation, or perhaps for a long time after. Clear
statutory guidelines should therefore be provided. These should establish
that the market value of RLDRs will be derived by finding the average price
per mu paid in market sales of RLDRs in the geographical area where this
expropriation is occurring. This average price should be based on at least
ten such transactions, and the transactions from which the average should be
derived must have taken place in the jurisdictions of comparable size nearest
to the current transaction.
8.

Provide, Through Amendment of the LAL, the RLCL, and the Property
Law, for “Optional Expropriation” of Non-Agricultural Collective
Land

Collectives will be given an option by statute to force local
governments to “expropriate,” without compensation, non-agricultural land
to which they hold RLDRs, so long as two-thirds of the collectives’
members agree. Farmers may also exercise this option, with the permission
of their collectives, for non-agricultural land to which they hold RLDRs, i.e.,
land they are currently using for their own housing. Collectives would lose
ownership rights, and farmers would use their use rights, to the expropriated
land if this option is exercised. However, collectives or farmers would then
be able to sell the RLDRs in that land to a commercial user who wished to
purchase urban LURs to that land from the state and develop it for other
purposes.
This provision recognizes that the value of the dual ownership system
and related use restrictions is rather limited with regards to collectively-
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owned land that is already developed for non-agricultural purposes.
Allowing collectives and farmers to transfer this land to the state ownership
system at their own discretion allows these parties to share in the profits
from urbanization. In practice, though, given the fact that compensation will
not be required, it seems unlikely that many collectives or farmers will
exercise this option, unless the profits to be gained from selling RLDRs to
commercial users were likely to be quite extraordinary. Thus, this provision
is unlikely to lead to a massive exodus of land out of the collective system
and is instead likely to be relevant only in areas of extremely rapid
urbanization and rapid increases in property values.
In summation, the RLDR scheme just described will solve multiple
vexing problems with the current system. It will reduce the expropriation
surplus by ensuring that local governments do not enjoy the entirety of the
urbanization surplus, and thereby reduce the demoralization costs resulting
from the size of the expropriation surplus. It will ensure that some of the
urbanization surplus accrues to farmers, settling some of the justice concerns
that plague the current expropriation system. Also, it will alleviate some of
the unfairness of the land use regulation system, which precedes and is
independent of any actual acts of land expropriation. RLDRs are a means of
ensuring that farmers are compensated for the initial, crucial unfairness that
results from Chinese land use law, without requiring governments to pay to
enforce a policy in pursuit of somewhat nebulous concepts of efficient
regulation. While a transfer of wealth from local governments and
developers to farmers will occur under this proposal, it will occur through a
mechanism that is complex and flexible enough to be an appropriate solution
to a problem whose own complexity goes well beyond the relatively simple
concept of a taking by eminent domain.
This proposal comes at what is perhaps an inopportune moment. It
has only been a few short years since China passed its comprehensive
Property Law and, in doing so, affirmed the broad parameters of the current
system governing ownership, use, and expropriation of rural land. That does
not mean, however, that opportunities for reform do not exist in the short
term. In recent years, provincial and other local governments have taken the
lead in proposing and implementing changes to the current system.184 The
RLDR proposal could be implemented on that level. Particularly in a
province like Guangdong that has relatively well-developed markets in rural
land already, such implementation might actually be more effective than the
unlikely event of national reform along these lines in the near future.
184

See, e.g., supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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The unusually protracted and inflammatory debate over the Property
Law is not irrelevant to the import of this article’s analysis. One of the more
heated debates about that statute involved a proposal to allow farmers to
mortgage their LURs. 185 Both the proponents and the opponents of that
proposal were motivated largely by concern for the standard of living of
Chinese farmers and social stability in China. The proponents emphasized
that the ability to monetize LURs could be a potentially powerful tool of
wealth generation for farmers; but the eventually successful opponents,
generally leftists, were concerned with the possibility of farmers losing their
land in even greater numbers than at present. This concern resonates both
with an ideological interest in preserving the remnants of leftist agrarianism
in the Chinese system and with very justifiable worries about social stability.
Also, this concern informs, directly or indirectly, some of the unfortunate
characteristics of the current rural land regime, including the inability of
farmers to sell their LURs to parties who are not other farmers.
RLDRs, much more than most proposals offered by Western scholars
in this area, represent an accommodation to that concern, in the context of
both the mortgage question and the land use question. RLDRs will afford
farmers some ability to monetize their land rights, but without running the
risk of losing those rights entirely to foreclosure. Similarly, they will allow
farmers to share in the urbanization surplus but will not eliminate the legal
ability of the state to limit the pace of urbanization if it begins to perceive
landless farmers as too large a threat to social stability. RLDRs also
represent a means of expanding farmers’ access to the market value of their
land without abridging the social security function of the compensation they
receive when their land is taken, discussed in Part III.C.2. above. In all of
these contexts, RLDRs represent a compromise solution that moderates
between several different and possibly conflicting goals, and between
opposing political forces.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The discussion above is intended to suggest a broad new approach to
the Chinese rural land problem. Much discussion of this problem by
American scholars to date, as shown in Part IV. of this article, has tended to
conclude that the standards of American eminent domain law—fair market
value compensation, public use requirements—are the most likely source of
185
See Zhu Keliang and Prosterman, supra note 5; 2005 Draft Property Law, supra note 31; Property
Law, supra note 14.
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solutions to this problem. This article, in contrast, takes a different approach,
one that is intended to be more sensitive to the Chinese legal background,
political context, and system of land ownership.
My analysis of the background legal regime has shown that
expropriation of land by the state cannot be treated as an extraordinary event,
given the underlying land use and ownership system, but must instead be
accepted as the necessary (barring constitutional change) legal vehicle for
urbanization. However, that does not mean that the surplus value to be
gained from urbanization must be entirely allocated to the parties doing the
expropriating. The fact that the urbanization surplus has become an
expropriation surplus under the current system has led to severe negative
consequences. A fiscal analysis that treats governments as financially
motivated actors fails to illuminate those consequences, in part because the
act of expropriation by local governments may well be efficient. However,
it is clear that the expropriation process as it currently exists produces
profound demoralization costs that are expressed in social unrest; these costs
may well be the result not just of absolutely low sums given as
compensation but of the existence of the expropriation surplus. Moreover,
the unfairness of the current policy is a product as much of underlying land
use entitlements as of the occurrence of expropriation. The analogy to a
regulatory taking helps to illuminate this reasoning, and supports a proposal
that gives Chinese farmers compensatory development rights that predate
and are, to some extent, independent of the actual act of expropriation.
RLDRs can be monetized even if no expropriation takes place; they
represent a means by which farmers can share in both the realized and the
unrealized urbanization surplus.

